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STATEMENT REGARDING JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 
78-2-2(3)0) and UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Issue 1: Did the trial court err in granting Appellee's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, precluding Appellant from an award of attorneys' fees as provided in the parties' 
Asset Purchase Agreement, whereby the Appellee acquired a motor vehicle dealership 
located in Heber City, Utah? 
Standard of Review: On appeal, the appellate court reviews the facts and 
inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Higgins v. Salt Lake 
County, 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993). Whether a party is entitled to summary judgment 
presents a question of law, the appellate court grants no deference to the trial court's legal 
conclusions and reviews them for correctness. See Higgins 855 P.2d at 235; Stangl v. Ernst 
Home Center. 948 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Whether attorney fees are 
recoverable is a question of law, which we review for correctness. Bonneville Distributing 
Co. v. Green River Development Associates, Inc., 2007 UT App 175. % 19, — P.3d—,2007 
WL 1500822 (quoting R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook. 2002 UT 11, f 16, 40 R3d 1119); See 
Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81,1127, 130 P.3d 325. 
Issue 2: Did the trial court err in granting Appellee's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, precluding Appellant from receiving applicable pre-judgment interest on the 
$59,384.79 award (such award determined by the consensus of the Accounting Team) as 
provided by statute? 
Standard of Review: On appeal, the appellate court reviews the facts and 
inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Higgins v. Salt Lake 
County, 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993). Whether a party is entitled to summary judgment 
presents a question of law, the appellate court grants no deference to the trial court's legal 
conclusions and reviews them for correctness. See Higgins, 855 P.2d at 235; Stangl v. Ernst 
Home Center. 948 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
Issue 3: Did the trial court err in granting Appellee an award of attorneys' fees at the 
end of trial as a result of the trial court concluding that the Appellee was the prevailing party? 
Standard of Review: Whether a party is the prevailing party in an action is a 
decision left to the sound discretion of the trial court and reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
See Carlson Distributing Company v. Salt Lake Brewing Co. 2004 UT App 227, f 16, 95 
P.3d 1171. No deference is given to a trial court's legal conclusions which are reviewed for 
correctness. See Wilcox v. CSX Corp.. 2003 UT 2116,70 P.3d 85; Springville Citizens for 
a Better Community v. City of Springville. 1999 UT 25 t 22, 979 P.2d 332. Whether 
attorney fees are recoverable is a question of law, which we review for correctness. 
Bonneville Distributing Co. v. Green River Development Associates. Inc.. 2007 UT App 
175,119, ~ P . 3 d — . 2007 WL 1500822 (quoting R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook. 2002 UT 11,1 
16,40P.3dll l9) . 
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Issue 4: Did the trial court err in determining the amount of damages to award 
Appellee at the end of the bench trial as a result of the trial court concluding the evidence 
supported the amount for the 1991 Ford pick-up and obsolete used pans issues? 
Standard of Review: These issues present mixed questions of law and fact. 
"We uphold [the] lower court's findings of fact unless the evidence supporting them is so 
lacking that we must conclude the finding[s are] 'clearly erroneous.'" Chang v. Soldier 
Summit Dev .. 2003 UT App 415, % 12, 82 P.3d 203 (quoting Jeffs v. Stubbs. 970 P.2d 1234. 
1244 (Utah 1998)). " 'In contrast, we review [the] trial court's conclusions as to the legal 
effect of a given set of found facts for correctness.'" Id. (quoting Stubbs, 970 P.2d at 1244). 
Bonneville Distributing Co. v. Green River Development Associates, Inc., 2007 UT App 
175, f 18, — P.3d — , 2007 WL 1500822. 
LIST OF STATUTES DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL 
UTAH CODE ANN. §15-1-1 and §15-1-4. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This appeal arises from an order to a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against 
Coet, entered on September 2, 2005, and a final Judgment and Order against Coet and for 
Labrum by the Honorable Derek P. Pullan of the Fourth Judicial District Court of Wasatch 
County, State of Utah, entered on December 1, 2006. 
In August 2001, Coet of Coet Chevrolet entered into an Asset Sale Agreement with 
Labrum for Labrum to purchase certain assets of Coet Chevrolet. Labrum contracted to buy 
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the new vehicle inventory, the used vehicle inventory, supplies, and the parts and accessories 
inventory, all furniture, fixtures, tools, equipment, intangibles, and the real estate of Coet 
Chevrolet. Labium performed due diligence prior to the closing of the sale, which included 
an individualized physical inventory of the parts and a detailed assessment of the new and 
used cars in Coet's inventories as of the date of closing, November 14, 2001. 
The formal closing regarding the purchase of the Chevrolet dealership occurred on or 
about November 14, 2001. The day following the closing (November 15, 2001), Labrum 
represented to Coet that a deficiency in the new motor vehicle inventory and in the used 
motor vehicle inventory existed and demanded a return of a portion of the purchase price. 
Whereupon, Coet presented two checks totaling $68,733.31 to Labrum. Soon after the 
payment of the checks from Coet to Labrum the parties experienced additional disputes 
regarding other areas of the sale. 
On or about November 13, 2003, Coet filed suit. On or about December 4, 2003, 
Labrum answered and counterclaimed against Coet. On January 20, 2005, under the order, 
direction, and supervision of the trial judge, the parties agreed that a team of accountants 
(one accountant selected by Coet and one selected by Labrum) would attempt to resolve 
specifically designated accounting issues regarding disputed aspects of the sale of the 
dealership. The parties entered into a Stipulated Case Management Order, stipulating that 
the accounting issues between the parties if resolved by unanimous agreement of the 
accounting team, would resolve such accounting issues, leaving only unresolved accounting 
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issues and all legal issues for resolution by the trial court. Additionally, the parties entered 
into an Accountants' Evaluation Agreement. In the Accountants' Evaluation Agreement, the 
parties set out the terms and specific areas for the accountants to attempt to resolve. The 
issues and amount of attorneys' fees and pre-judgment interest were not included in the 
explicit areas of consideration for the accountants' determination. Moreover, the 
Accountants' Evaluation Agreement contained a broad release of claims and claim preclusion 
provisions. The accountants issued a letter of understanding concerning their evaluation of 
designated accounting claims, resulting in the payment of $59,384.79 from Labrum to Coet 
("Accountants' Findings"). Labrum paid the amount of $59,384.79 on or about May 12, 
2005. Labrum's payment was approximately 42 months after Coet paid Labrum the 
demanded $68,733.31 the day after the closing of the purchase of the dealership. The 
accountants did not attempt to make a determination regarding attorneys' fees or pre-
judgement interest on the amount they awarded Coet, nor were they capable of ascertaining 
the legal standard for the award of attorneys' fees. 
On or about September 2, 2005, the trial court granted Labrum's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment dismissing Coet's claims for attorneys' fees provided in the Asset Sale 
Agreement and pre-judgment interest allowed by Utah statute. The trial court determined in 
its Order, prepared by Labrum, that Coet's claims for attorneys' fees and pre-judgment 
interest were released and waived under Section Nine of the Accountants' Evaluation 
Agreement upon Labrum's payment to Coet of the amount the Accounting Team determined 
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was owed. The remaining unresolved issues from the pleadings filed by the parties were 
litigated during a one day trial on or about August 8, 2006, before Fourth District Judge, 
Judge Pullan. At the close of oral argument, the trial court announced from the bench that 
all of Coet's remaining claims against Labrum were dismissed with prejudice and that 
Labium was entitled to judgment against Coet in the amount of $11,455.26, which 
represented "obsolete parts." Further, the trial court announced that its prevailing party 
decision would be made "in light of prior settlement of some claims and the Court's 
judgment entered today." Both parties moved for attorneys' fees. The Court denied Coet's 
Motion and granted Labium's in the amount of $28,550.00. The trial court awarded 
Labium's attorneys' fees based upon its determination that Labrum was the prevailing party 
in that Labrum prevailed on the remaining causes of action litigated at trial and did not 
consider the amount awarded to Coet by the Accounting Team. Coet paid the judgment of 
$40,005.26 (the amount for the parts inventory and the prevailing party attorneys' fees). 
FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Larry J. Coet Chevrolet owned and operated the Chevroletdealership in Heber 
City from 1986 until he sold it to Labrum in November of 2001. (R-674, p. 191:14-15). 
2. In August 2001 Coet entered into an Asset Sale Agreement for the sale of the 
dealership to Danny Labrum Chevrolet. (R-674, p. 191:15-17). 
3. In August 2001, Coet and Labrum executed the Asset Sale Agreement for the 
purchase of the dealership. (R-411-433; Pit Ex.1). 
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4. On November 14,2001, Coet and Labrum executed the Asset Sale Agreement -
Closing Statement. (R- Pit. Ex. 2; R-353). 
5. The Asset Sale Agreement specifically states: "In the event any action or 
proceeding is taken or brought by either party concerning this Agreement, the prevailing 
party shall be entitled to recover its costs and reasonable attorneys' fees, whether such sums 
are expended with or without suit, at trial, on appal or in any bankruptcy or insolvency 
proceeding. Asset Sale Agreement % 11.12 (R-416). 
6. In the Agreement, Labrum agreed to purchase the used vehicle inventory, 
which includes all used motor vehicles which are in the seller's inventory at the time of 
closing, which vehicles have been previously titled. (R-674, p. 191:19-21). 
7. Labrum also agreed to purchase Coet's parts and accessories inventory 
established by physical count as of the closing, excluding any and all obsolete parts. (R-674, 
p. 191:21-24). 
8. The Agreement defined obsolete parts to mean any part not included in the 
manufacturer's current parts pricing catalog, any part on which the seat has been opened or 
is materially damaged, any part which is missing portions of its working mechanisms so that 
it would not be accepted for return, and parts in excess of a 180-day supply. (R-674, pp. 
191:25-196:5). 
9. If, after conducting the physical inventory, the value of then existing parts was 
less than $68,000.00, the sale price for the dealership would be adjusted downward by the 
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difference between S68,000.00 and the actual value of the parts. If the value of the parts 
exceeded $68,000, there would be no adjustment. (R-674, p.192:6-11). 
10. On November 12, 2001, Coet, Labium, Lyle Labrum, and Rachel Labrum, 
conducted a parts inventory. (R-674, p. 194:1-8). 
11. After approximately five hours, Labrum agreed that continuing the inventory 
would not be necessary because he was satisfied that more than $68,000.00 in parts existed. 
(R-674, p. 194:16-23). 
12. On November 13, 2001, following the conclusion of the physical inventories 
of parts, used vehicles, new vehicles, and other expenses to be satisfied by either Coet or 
Labrum, Coet and Labrum executed a document stating, among other things, Danny Labrum 
and Larry J. Coet agree that parts inventory total $68,000.00. (R- Pit. Ex. 3; R-351). 
13. On November 14,2001, the parties met in Salt Lake City at a title company for 
the closing. As part of the closing both parties executed a closing statement. In the statement 
the parties agreed that used car inventory was valued at $290,275. No adjustments were 
made for parts. (R-674, p. 195:8-13). 
14. The day following the closing of the sale of the dealership, Labrum demanded, 
and Coet refunded to Labrum $68,733.31, a substantial portion of which was not, in fact, 
owing. (R-511). 
15. On November 8, 2001, less than one week before the closing, Mr. Gary 
Robinson purchased a new truck from Coet. The purchase included a trade of a 1991 Chevy 
pickup. (R-674, p. 193:4-12). 
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16. A week before the closing, Coet agreed to allow a customer, Johnny Jessen, to 
exchange his 1992 Ford pickup for the 1991 Chevy pickup Mr. Robinson was trading in and 
Coet agreed to pay the $2,300 balance on the 1992 Ford pickup. (R-674, p. 193:4-12). 
17. Mr. Jessen would get the 1991 Chevy pickup at the time he delivered the 1992 
Ford pickup to Coet. (R-674, p. 193:13-14). 
18. On November 13,2001, at 6:00 a.m. Mr. Jessen delivered the 1992 Ford pickup 
to the dealership with the keys and title and drove away with Mr. Robinson's 1991 Chevy 
pickup. (R-674, p. 193:15-25). 
19. On or about December 12,2001 ,Coet issued a check for $2,300 to pay off a lien 
on a certain vehicle. (R-674, p. 195:16-17). Coet testified it was for the 1992 Ford pickup 
truck. (R-674, pp. 41:14-42:18). 
20. The 1992 Ford pickup truck was included on the used car inventory list, but 
Coet did not set a price for the Ford pickup, Labrum did not offer a price for the Ford pickup. 
Coet and Labrum did not negotiate for the 1992 Ford pickup. (R- PL Ex.10; R-674, pp. 
39:12-25 and 40: 8-9). 
21. The total of the used car inventory paid by Labrum, excluding the 1992 Ford 
pickup, was $290,275. (R-674, p. 38:24 - 39:13; R-Pl. Ex. 2; R-353). 
22. In January 2002 Labrum sold the 1992 Ford pickup to Carl Givens for 
$5,000.00. 
23. Following a year of negotiations, Coet and Labrum stipulated to having a team 
of accountants review and attempt to resolve accounting issues. (R-72). 
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24*. On February 9, 2005, Coet and Labrum entered into the Letter of 
Understanding Concerning Evaluation of Claims ("Accountants Evaluation Agreement"). 
This Accountants Evaluation Agreement set forth the terms for the Accounting Team. (R-
73-79). 
25. On February 14, 2005, the trial court entered a Stipulated Case Management 
Order. The Order directed the parties to submit all of the accounting disputes, including all 
accounting issues raised as part of the claims or counterclaims in this lawsuit, to an 
accounting evaluation team (the "Accounting Team"), consistent with the terms of the 
parties'letter agreement. (R-82-86). 
26. On or around April 27,2005, the Accounting Team produced its findings and 
provided them in letter form. The Accounting Team determined that after reviewing the used 
vehicle inventory, parts inventory, additional expenses agreed to at closing, interest in 
delayed payment on real estate and new and used vehicle flooring, wholesale cost of 
purchasing vehicles, new vehicle inventory and other claims, Labrum owed Coet $59,384.79. 
(R-104-106). 
27. On June 21, 2005, the trial court ruled that it appeared the Accounting Team 
was unable to resolve all accounting issues and held that the Stipulated Case Management 
Order was still in effect. (R-133). 
28. On September 2, 2005, the trial court entered its Order Granting Labrum's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The trial court ordered that Laburm's Motion for 
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Partial Summary Judgment be granted and Plaintiffs' claims for attorneys' fees and pre-
judgment interest dismissed with prejudice. (R-318-326). 
29. On August 8,2006, a bench trial was held before Judge Pullan on all remaining 
issues. 
30. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court announced from the bench its 
findings and conclusions, declaring that Coet owed Labrum $11,455.26. (R-657). 
31. The court reserved its order after the trial regarding the issue of attorney's fees 
to allow the parties to brief the question of who was the prevailing party "in light of prior 
settlements" of some claims and the court's judgment entered at the end of the trial. (R-674, 
p. 199:12-16). 
32. In its November 1, 2006 Ruling, the trial court commented in a footnote 
regarding the broad applicability of the attorneys fees and costs provisions contained in the 
Asset Sale Agreement. The trial court commented as follows: 
This provision is drafted broadly. It applies to "any action or proceeding 
. . . taken or brought by either Party concerning this Agreement." By using the 
verbs "taken" and "brought" in the alternative, the parties expanded the 
meaning of the term "action." Certainly civil actions "brought" by either party 
could give rise to an award of attorney's fees, but so could "any action taken 
. . Concerning this Agreement . . . whether [the fees] are expended with or 
without trial." 
Here, the parties resolved the bulk of their claims without trial by 
submitting them to the evaluation team. That method of settlement - during the 
course of which both parties incurred attorney's fees - constituted an action 
taken by the parties concerning the Agreement. Absent the release and waiver 
in the Letter Agreement, the prevailing party as determined by the evaluation 
team was entitled to recover its costs and attorney's fees. 
(R-639). 
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33. On November 1, 2006, the trial court entered its Ruling, finding that Labium 
was the prevailing party based upon Lab rum prevailing on all litigated claims and awarded 
Labrum his attorneys' fees and costs. (R-634-641). 
34. On or about December 1, 2006, in the Judgment and Order signed by the trial 
court, Coet's claims were dismissed in their entirety, with prejudice. Labrum was awarded 
Judgment against Coet in the amount of $40,005.26 together with interest. The Judgment 
$ 11,455.26 for claims Labrum made against Coet and $28,550.00 for Labrm's attorneys'fees 
awarded as the prevailing party. (R-657). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
On January 20,2005, in order to expedite a resolution to some of the disputed claims 
between Coet and Labrum, the parties (under supervision of the court in the telephonic 
Scheduling Conference) stipulated to present all the accounting claims to the Accounting 
Team. The Accounting Team would attempt to resolve all of the accounting issues. On 
February 10, 2005, the parties signed and executed the Accountants Evaluation Agreement 
delineating the terms of the agreement and instructions for the accountants. It also set out 
the specific accounting claims for the Accounting Team to address. After the signing of the 
Accountants Evaluation Agreement, Defendant prepared the Stipulated Case Management 
Order. Both parties agreed to the Order and it was signed on February 14, 2005. 
The Order supported and clarified th^ccountants Evaluation Agreement by repeating 
the specifics of the narrow scope, role, and purpose of the Accounting Team, as well as, the 
claims affected by the release. The Accounting Team's role was limited to reviewing only 
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the specific accounting issues it could unanimously agree upon, and left the unresolved 
accounting issues and all legal issues for resolution by the trial court. The Accountants 
Evaluation Agreement did not release any legal claims. As such, any and all legal claims 
have not been waived. 
The telephonic Scheduling Hearing, Stipulated Case Management Order and 
Accountants Evaluation Agreement all provided authority and context for the Accounting 
Team to resolve accounting issues the best it could. Neither the parties nor the trial court, 
wanted nor expected, the Accounting Team to determine legal issues, such as attorneys' fees, 
pre-judgment interest and prevailing party status. The trial court erred in allowing itself to 
be convinced to misapply the release of claim language and by ceding its powers to the 
Accounting Team, instead of harmonizing the language to the topic of the Accountants 
Evaluation Agreement with the conflicting terms and language. Only a court can determine 
if attorneys' fees are to be awarded and its amount. Only a court can determine if pre-
judgment interest is awarded and the amount. Only a court can determine which litigant is 
the prevailing party. 
Additionally, the trial court erred in identifying Labrum as the prevailing party in the 
matter. While determining the prevailing party may be complicated and tap the equitable 
powers of the court, it is important that the court make the determination which fulfills the 
parties' written agreement, is the equitable conclusion, and does not destroy public policy by 
encouraging litigants who have a strong case to refuse alternative dispute resolution methods 
for fear of forfeiting an award of attorneys' fees and interest. 
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The trial court also erred when it found that Labrum relied upon Coet's comment 
regarding the obsolete parts inventory. Standing alone, Coet's comments did not meet the 
elements of fraud, nor its standard of proof. Importantly, Labrum had the duty to use due 
diligence and inspect the parts inventory. It was Labrum's decision and his alone, that 
stopped the parts inventory inspection short of completion. It was Labrum who declared that 
he was satisfied the parts inventory met or exceeded $68,000.00. It was Labrum who 
executed two different documents demonstrating his satisfaction that the parts inventory met 
or exceeded $68,000.00. 
Relatedly, the evidence found by the trial court does not support a finding for Labrum 
relative to a certain 1992 Ford pickup truck. A 1992 Ford pickup was delivered to Coet's 
Chevrolet about the time of the dealership's sale to Labrum. While the 1992 Ford was listed 
on an inventory list, Labrum and Coet did not negotiate and agree upon a price transferring 
the 1992 Ford from Coet to Labrum. Labrum, with the trial court's support, wants to include 
the 1992 Ford as a "throw-in" to Labrum in the purchase. Coet wants to be paid for the 
pickup truck that he owned and was sold without his permission nor compensation. The 
evidence demonstrates that Labrum never purchased the 1992 Ford pickup truck, but he 
testified that he sold it for $5,000.00. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD APPELLANT 
ATTORNEYS' FEES PURSUANT TO THE ASSET PURCHASE 
AGREEMENT. 
The trial court granted Labrum's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment precluding 
Coet from an award of attorneys' fees accrued in enforcing the Asset Sale Agreement 
allowed by the attorneys' fees clause contained in the Asset Sale Agreement.1 The trial court 
erroneously granted Labrum's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by determining Coet 
waived his rights to any attorneys' fees, costs, and interest by the failure to include them in 
the Accountant's Evaluation Agreement. (R- 319-320). This Court grants no deference to 
the trial court's legal conclusions in its decision to grant Partial Summary Judgment. See 
Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). Whether attorneys' fees are 
recoverable is a question of law. Bonneville Distributing Co. v. Green River Development 
Associates. Inc., 2007 UT App 175, | 19, — P.3d — , 2007 WL 1500822 (quoting R.T. 
Nielson Co. v. Cook. 2002 UT 11,116, 40 P.3d 1119). 
The Asset Sale Agreement and the terms contained therein are unambiguous. Neither 
Coet nor Lambrum asserted that the attorneys' fees clause was ambiguous. Neither do they 
dispute the validity of the clause. There is no dispute that Coet accrued fees and costs to 
1
 In the event any action or proceeding is taken or brought by either party concerning 
this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its costs and reasonable 
attorneys' fees, whether such sums are expended with or without suit, at trial, on appeal or 
in any bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding. See Asset Sale Agreement, Section 11.10 (R-
416). 
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enforce the Asset Sale Agreement. The Accounting Team determined that Labrum owed 
Coet $59,384.79. It has not been disputed that Labrum should pay interest for nearly four 
years he had the use of Coet's money. The dispute comes in how the trial court interpreted 
the Asset Sale Agreement, the Accountants' Evaluation Agreement, the Accountants' 
Findings, the Stipulated Case Management Order and the amount of authority the trial court 
conceded to the Team of Accountants to determine accounting and apparent legal issues and 
controversies. 
Neither Coet nor Labrum argued that the terms of the Accountants' Evaluation 
Agreement were vague or ambiguous. As a result, there was no need to consider parole 
evidence outside the provisions of the four corners of the Accountants' Evaluation 
Agreement to determine the intent of the parties. (R-320). The standard for interpreting 
contracts is articulated well in Green River Canal Company, 2003 UT 50,117, 84 P.3d 1134. 
"The underlying purpose of construing or interpreting a contract is to ascertain 
the intentions of the parties to the contract." WebBank v. American Gen. 
Annuity Svc. Corp., 2002 UT 88, t 17, 54 P.3d 1139. When interpreting a 
contract, "we look to the writing itself to ascertain the parties' intentions, and 
we consider each contract provision . . . in relation to all of the others, with a 
view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none." Id. at ^  18 (quoting Jones 
v. ERA Brokers ConsoL 2000 UT 61, f 12, 40 P.3d 1129). "If the language 
within the four corners of the contract is unambiguous, the parties' intentions 
are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language, and the 
contract may be interpreted as a matter of law." Id. At f 19 (quoting Cent. Fla. 
Invests. Inc. v. Parkwest Assoc. 2002 UT 3, f 12, 40 P.3d 599). 
It is clear and unambiguous that the trial court ordered the parties to pick and use the 
Accountant Team to resolve the disputed accounting issues (R-72). Coet and Labrum 
discussed the Accountant Team with the trial court during the Scheduling Conference. The 
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trial court, in its Stipulated Case Management Order, ordered the parties to use the 
Accounting Team. In the Stipulated Case Management Order, the trial court specifically 
outlined the issues the Accounting Team were to address. 
(1) The Court enunciated its desire to have each of the parties select an 
accountant/CPA with the expectation that those issues regarding funds claimed 
by the parties that could be resolved by the accountant by mutual affirmation 
will likely help the parties achieve an efficient and just resolution of this 
matter; and 
1. Submission of Accounting Disputes to Accounting Evaluation Team. 
The parties shall submit all of the accounting disputes, including all accounting 
issues raised as part of the claims or counterclaims in this lawsuit, to an 
accounting evaluation team, consistent with the terms of the parties' letter 
agreement, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit A. 
(R-85). Additionally, the Accountants' Evaluation Agreement expressly lists the issues the 
Accounting Team was to attempt to unanimously resolve. The use of the accountants saved 
time, fees, and judicial resources. This appeal arises due to the trial court's failure to 
harmonize apparently conflicting language and terms of the Accountants' Evaluation 
Agreement relative to the legal issues of attorneys' fees and pre-judgment interest. 
The Accountants' Evaluation Agreement did not appear to be ambiguous, but 
contained provisions which conflicted, or were not in harmony, with other more specific 
terms. 
Harmonizing conflicting or apparently ambiguous contract language before 
concluding that provisions are actually ambiguous is an important step in the 
hierarchy of rules for contract interpretation. A trial court must first" 'attempt 
to harmonize all of the contract's provisions and all of its terms' when 
determining whether the plain language of the contract is ambiguous." Wagner 
v. Clifton. 2002 UT 109,t 16, 62 P.3d 440 (citation omitted). "[I]t is axiomatic 
that a contract should be interpreted so as to harmonize all of its provisions and 
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all of its terms, which terms should be given effect if it is possible to do so." 
LPS Hosp. v. Capitol Life Ins. Co.. 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988). Thus, to 
harmonize the provisions of a contract, "we examine the entire contract and all 
of its parts in relation to each other and give a reasonable construction of the 
contract as a whole to determine the parties' intent." Brixen & Christopher 
Architects v. Elton. 777 P.2d 1039, 1043 (Utah Ct.App.1989). 
Gillmor v. Macey, 2005 UT App 351, ^ 19, 121 P.3d 57. Admittedly, when viewed in 
isolation, Paragraph Nine's plain language may lead to the conclusion that Coet's claim for 
attorneys' fees and pre-judgment interest, as provided in the Asset Sale Agreement may have 
been waived or released. On its face the Accountants Evaluation Agreement appears to limit 
Coet's claims. However, if this Court considers all four corners of the Accountants 
Evaluation Agreement, the Court will be able to harmonize the facially conflicting terms. 
Our rules of contract interpretation require, "[i]f the language within the four 
comers of the contract is unambiguous," that courts " 'first look to the four 
corners of the agreement to determine the intentions of the parties ...' from the 
plain meaning of the contractual language." Central Fla. Invs., Inc. v. Parkwest 
Assocs., 2002 UT 3,1 12, 40 P.3d 599 (citations omitted). 
Gillmor v. Macev, 2005 UT App 351, If 34, 121 P.3d 57. From the four corners of the 
Accountants Evaluation Agreement, this Court can harmonize the waiver of Paragraph Nine 
and the exclusive area of accounting issues in the remaining three comers of the documents. 
The trial court identified that the attorneys' fees clause contained in the Asset Purchase 
Agreement was to be read broadly. However, the trial court showed its error that the 
attorneys' fees clause was waived by the inconsistent language of the Accountants Evaluation 
Agreement. The trial court held, 
This provision is drafted broadly. It applies to "any action or proceeding 
. . . taken or brought by either Party concerning this Agreement." By using the 
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verbs "taken" and "brought" in the alternative, the parties expanded the 
meaning of the term "action." Certainly civil actions "brought" by either party 
could give rise to an award of attorney's fees, but so could "any action taken 
. . . Concerning this Agreement. . . whether [the fees] are expended with or 
without trial." 
Here, the parties resolved the bulk of their claims without trial by 
submitting them to the evaluation team. That method of settlement - during the 
course of which both parties incurred attorney's fees - constituted an action 
taken by the parties concerning the Agreement. Absent the release and waiver 
in the Letter Agreement, the prevailing party as determined by the evaluation 
team was entitled to recover its costs and attorney's fees. 
(R-639). 
Additionally, the Accountants' Evaluation Agreement is very specific in some areas: 
the specific list of areas for the accounting team to consider (|2); the deadline for results 
(|7); and the effect on other (non-accounting-type) claims (f 10)2. All of these paragraphs, 
terms, and language are explicit and deal with accounting issues, exclusively. Other 
paragraphs, terms, and language of the Accountants' Evaluation Agreement read without the 
context of the specific paragraphs are broad and out of harmony with the remaining portions 
in that they deal with issues in addition to accounting issues, for example, the binding effect 
and release of claims fl[9) and objective of the evaluation fl[3) (R-73-79). By properly 
harmonizing all of the terms of the Accountants' Evaluation Agreement, the trial court would 
2
 10. Preclusive Effect on Additional Claims. The parties acknowledge and agree 
that the claims raised in this letter agreement constitute all of the accounting-type claims for 
damages related to the Asset Sale Agreement and closing. The parties shall be precluded 
from raising or asserting (in the Lawsuit or otherwise) any claims for damages related to the 
Asset Sale Agreement and the Closing, except for: (i) any accounting issues that are not 
resolved by the Evaluation Team and (ii) any legal issues that must be resolved in order to 
achieve a complete resolution of the accounting issues specifically addressed in this 
Agreement. (R-74). 
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have found that Coet should have been awarded his attorneys' fees pursuant to the Asset 
Purchase Agreement and that the judicially mandated task for the Accounting Team was to 
address accounting issues only and not legal issues such as the award of attorneys' fees. The 
Court should consider that the paragraphs with specific terms and conditions should be given 
more weight and consideration than the general, boiler-plate, and over-reaching paragraphs. 
See Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Dick Bradv Svs.. Inc.. 731 P.2d475, 480 (Utah 1986) (Howe, 
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 203(c) 
for the rule that general terms of a contract are not given as much weight as specific terms); 
accord Mayer v. Pierce County Med. Bureau. 909 P.2d 1323, 1327 (1995). Moreover, it is 
not the role of the parties, nor of the trial court, to hand over to the Accounting Team the duty 
to determine legal issues. 
In the context of the trial court's involvement, suggestion and supervision, it is 
unambiguous as to the desire of the singular and specific role the Accounting Team were to 
play. The Minute entry of the Telephonic Scheduling Conference, held January 20, 20053, 
(R-72), the Accountants' Evaluation Agreement (R-73-79), and the Stipulated Case 
Management Order (R-82-86), all state the same thing, the Accounting Team was to attempt 
to resolve accounting issues with unanimity. If there arose accounting issues where a 
unanimous consensus was unobtainable, the court would resolve them at trial. It is clear and 
3
 Mr, Call would move to allowing [sic] the accountants to proceed with all issues 
both the disputed amount and the counterclaim issues . . . Court will further require that 
before discovery begins that each party's accountant go over all the disputed amounts and 
see if the parties can reach a resolution. (R-72). 
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unambiguous that the Accounting Team, following the trial court's order, was to address, 
specifically and exclusively, accounting issues. 
The trial court did not impart its power to the Accounting Team to determine whether 
attorneys' fees were to be awarded, and if so, the amount to be awarded, nor if and what 
amount the interest on the results of the Accountant's Findings award should be. Both of 
those issues are legal issues to be determined only by the court. 
Whether attorney fees are recoverable in an action is a question of law [that] 
we [the Utah Court of Appeals] review for correctness. "Courts generally 
review a trial judge's decision on the amount of attorney fees for abuse of 
discretion. In most decisions dealing with fee awards, "appellate deference is 
owed to the trial judge who actually presided over the proceeding and has first-
hand familiarity with the litigation." . . . Further, our courts have addressed 
methodologies for determining which party or parties, perhaps among multiple 
parties or claims, occupy prevailing party status in various contexts Indeed 
[cjourts have, in extraordinary situations, declined to award attorney fees to a 
prevailing party in spite of an enforceable contractual provision." 
A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Guv, 2002 UT App 73, | | 7, 8 and 12,47 P.3d 
92 (internal citations omitted). Labrum argues that because the attorneys' fees, costs, and 
interest issues were not included in the Accountants' Evaluation Agreement, the accountants 
did not reach a determination and Coet is, therefore, precluded from being awarded either 
fees or interest. Even if the issues of fees, costs, and interest were included in the 
Accountants' Evaluation Agreement, it would be clearly inappropriate for the accountants 
to address them. Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, | 127, 130 P.3d 325 (Attorney fees are 
awarded only when authorized by statute or by contract. The award of attorney fees is a 
matter of law). 
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Labrum asserts that the broad language contained in Paragraph Nine of the 
Accountants' Evaluation Agreement precludes any award of attorneys' fees, costs, or interest. 
Importantly, however, Paragraph Nine's language regarding the release of claims is so broad 
that if read literally, as Labrum argued, without harmonizing the inconsistencies, the parties 
would only be able to pursue claims of parts obsolescence and unresolved accounting claims 
before the trial judge, precluding all other issues. The Accounting Team left unresolved four 
claims: (1) Labrum Chevrolet's claim for $18,862.50 based on obsolete parts, (2) Coet's 
claim for $4,300.00 based on a used 1992 Ford truck in inventory at the time of the closing; 
(3) Coet Chevrolet's claims for $6,076.00 based upon alleged oil and gas inventory; and (4) 
an unclear $9,000.00 issue related to new car inventory (R-Df. Ex. 17; 590-592).4 However, 
the trial court dealt with only three issues, (1) the 1992 Ford pickup,; (2) did Labrum pay 
Coet for oil, gas, and grease purchased under the Asset Sale Agreement; and (3) did Coet 
make a fraudulent representation or negligent misrepresentation as to the issue of obsolete 
parts. (R-R-674, p 196:3-13). If the trial court applied the language of Paragraph Nine as 
Labrum suggests, the court would have been precluded from hearing and ruling on many 
issues, including Labrum's claims of fraudulent representation and negligent 
misrepresentation. 
Clearly, the trial court failed to harmonize the disparate and inconsistent terms of the 
unambiguous Accountants Evaluation Agreement. Paragraph Nine should be read in the 
4
 Issue four was dismissed by stipulation of the parties. 
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context of the accounting issues that were determined by the accountants and binding upon 
the parties. It reads, 
9. Binding Effect; Admissibility of Evaluation Results; Release of Claims. 
Coet and Labrum agree that the unanimous findings and conclusions of the 
Evaluation Team shall be binding on the parties, and each party accepts and 
agrees to abide by the unanimous findings and conclusions of the Evaluation 
Team. The report(s) and results of the Evaluation Team shall be admissible in 
any legal proceeding between the parties to prove or disprove any fact in issue. 
Each party agrees to pay to the other party any sum(s) the Evaluation Team 
unanimously determines is owed by such party to the other party. Upon 
payment by Labrum of any such sum (if any), Coet, for and on behalf of 
himself, itself and its owners, principals, affiliates, officers, directors, agents, 
employees, affiliates, successors and assigns, releases and forever discharges 
Labrum and its owners, principals affiliates, officers, directors, agents, 
employees, affiliates, successors and assigns, from any and all claims, 
demands, suits, causes of action or obligations of whatever nature, known or 
unknown, contingent or non-contingent, that anyone claiming through or under 
Coet may have or believe to have against Labrum, including without limitation 
all claims that relate in any way to the lawsuit with Civil Number 030500537, 
currently pending in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Wasatch County, 
State of Utah (the "Lawsuit"), and any claims asserted or that could have been 
asserted in that lawsuit, excepting from this release only such claims as to 
which there is not a unanimous decision by the Evaluation Team. Upon 
payment by Coet of any such sum (if any), Labrum, for an on behalf of himself, 
itself and its owners, principals, affiliates, officers, directors, agents, 
employees, affiliates, successors and assigns, releases and forever discharges 
Coet and its owners, principals, affiliates, officers, directors, agents, 
employees, affiliates, successors and assigns, from any and all claim, demands, 
suits, causes of action or obligations of whatever nature, known or unknown, 
contingent or non-contingent, that anyone claiming through or under Labrum 
may have or believe to have against Coet, including without limitation all 
claims that relate in any way to the lawsuit with Civil Number 030500537, 
currently pending in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Wasatch County, 
State of Utah, and any claims asserted or that could have been asserted in that 
lawsuit, excepting from this release only such claims as to which there is not 
a unanimous decision by the Evaluation Team and claims relating to parts 
obsolescence. With respect to the value of parts that are or are not Obsolete 
Parts shall be binding on both Coet and Labrum. 
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(R-78-79). 
Unfortunately, the trial court applied Paragraph Nine of the Accountants' Evaluation 
Agreement, as if it had given its authority to determine fees, costs, and interest to a team of 
two non-legally trained accountants. Inferentially, if the trial court expected the accountants 
to determine the amount of fees and pre-judgment interest, the Accounting Team would have 
had to determine the amount of the award without any discovery, submission of bills, costs 
in evidence, or guidance as to the award and amount of interest. Surely, this mistake by the 
trial court should be corrected. After all, Coet had delivered to Labrum $68,733.31, less than 
24 hours after closing, in November 2001. The Accounting Team unanimously agreed that 
$59,384.79 was to be returned to Coet. 
Attorneys' fees are awarded in certain circumstances when provided by statute, the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, agreement by the parties and when the court deems it 
warranted. The Court alone determines the appropriateness of the award. Rule 73 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states "when attorney fees are authorized by contract or by 
law, a request for attorneys fees shall be supported by affidavit or testimony." The Court 
then determines the reasonableness of the attorneys' fees. See Amvx v. Columbia House 
Holdings Inc., 2005 UT App. 118,1f 2, 110 P.3d 176. Here, the Asset Purchase Agreement 
specifically provided for attorneys' fees and costs. As such, a party is allowed its attorneys' 
fees and costs under the Rules of Civil Procedure and are allowed them as a matter of course 
to the prevailing party. When determined appropriate by the Court, attorneys' fees are 
considered costs and included in the award of costs. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) 
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states "costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise 
directs." The determination and evaluation of the amount of the award of attorneys' fees is 
clearly outside the scope and authority given to the Accounting Team as set forth in the 
Evaluation Agreement and Stipulated Case Management Order and is a separate legal issue 
for resolution only by the Court. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT INTEREST ON 
THE AWARD AS PROVIDED BY STATUTE, 
The trial court held in its Order Granting Labium's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, that due to Coet's failure to specifically include the award of pre-judgment interest 
in the Accountants Evaluation Agreement, Coet released and waived a pre-judgment interest 
award (R-317-326). The trial court erred in its Order, because the Accountants Evaluation 
Agreement was authorizing the Accounting Team to determine accounting issues and not 
legal issues. See discussion supra. Part I. This Court should reverse the trial court's Order, 
relative to the award of pre-judgment interest, based upon the trial court's failure to 
harmonize the terms, language, and condition of the Letter Agreement. Id. "A trial court's 
decision to grant or deny pre-judgment interest presents a question of law which we review 
for correctness." Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc.. 2003 UT 41,116, 82 P.3d 1064 (quotations 
and citation omitted). 
The Accountants Evaluation Agreement cannot fairly be read to waive Coet's claim 
of pre-judgment interest on the money Labrum possessed for nearly four years. The 
Accountants Evaluation Agreement does not state, explicitly nor implicitly, that Coet was 
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waiving his right to an award of pre-judgment interest. Also at the time Coet signed the 
Accountants Evaluation Agreement, Coet was not entitled to pre-judgment interest because 
it had not yet been determined by the Accounting Team that Labium owed Coet money from 
2001, which would have accrued interest. See de Kwiatkowski v. Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc. 
Civ. No. 964798VM, 2000 WL 729118,(S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2000) (Where an entitlement to 
pre-judgment interest exists as a matter of law, its award may properly be determined by the 
court even after a jury verdict on damages). See Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co.. 717 F.2d 683, 
693 (2nd Cir. 1983) ("Plaintiffs failure to pursue his request for pre-judgment interest during 
the trial or even to demand such interest in his complaint does not amount to a waiver of the 
right to interest"); Buffalo Oil Terminal Inc. v. William B. Kimmins & Sons, Inc.. 248 
N.Y.S.2d 499, 501 (Sup.Ct. Ene County 1964) affd 23 A.D.2d 970, 260 N.Y.S.2d 621 (4th 
Depft 1964) ("Plaintiffs failure to request the court to instruct the jury to fix the interest on 
any verdict they might render, does not constitute a waiver of the right to interest"). 
Pre-judgment interest on an award is determined by the Court after judgment5 on the 
5
 This Court, while addressing the issue of allowing interest on overdue debts 
determined in an administrative setting, instead of a judicial setting, held, 
This would be particularly so where, as Vali alleges happened here, the 
principal amount was arrived at through a negotiated settlement which 
contemplated administrative resolution of the interest issue another day. As 
both parties recognize, the law favors settlements. See Tracy-Collins Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Travelstead. 592 P.2d 605, 607-09 (Utah 1979). A rule 
disallowing interest when the principal amount is determined through 
settlement, whether under administrative auspices or otherwise, would 
certainly have a chilling effect on settlements in cases where the amount of 
disputed principal can be resolved by negotiation even though no settlement 
can be reached concerning interest. 
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specific causes of action under UTAH CODE ANN, §15-1-4. The Utah Supreme Court has 
ruled that "[o]ur Statute, § 15-1-4, U.C.A. 1953, provides that unless otherwise agreed by the 
parties, judgment shall bear interest.. .This interest follows the judgment as a matter of law." 
Dairy Distributors, Inc. v. Local Union 976 Western Conference of Teamsters, 396 P.2d 47 
(Utah 1964). Rule 54(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states 'The clerk must include 
in any judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision from the time it was 
rendered, and with costs, if the same have been taxed or ascertained." Utah R. Civ. P. 54(e). 
As such, award of interest is also a legal issue, and not an accounting issue and is not waived 
by the Letter Agreement. 
Pre-judgment interest could have been properly awarded by the trial court either at the 
submission of the Accounting Team's Accountants' Findings to the end of the trial, because 
by then Plaintiffs losses were fixed, could be measured by facts and figures, and were 
calculable within a mathematical certainty. In its Accountants' Findings, the Accounting 
Team determined that Labrum owed Coet $59,384.79. The trial court would have been able 
to measure the interest based upon the known amount of loss and the particular time Labrum 
had use of Coet's money. "Prejudgment interest is properly awarded when the damage is 
complete, the loss can be measured by facts and figures, and the amount of loss is fixed as 
of a particular time. [A] court may only award prejudgment interest if damages are calculable 
Vali Convalescent and Care Institutions v. Division of Health Care Financing. 797 P.2d 438. 
445 n.12 (Utah App.,1990). 
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within a mathematical certainty." Orlob v. Wasatch Med. Mgmt, 2005 UT App 430, % 35, 
124 P.3d 269 (alteration m original) (quotations and citation omitted). 
Under the present facts, an award of pre-judgment interest to Coet is warranted. 
Labium delayed payment and held and used Coet's money ($68,733.31) for 42 months, 
"Paying money later with interest is, in legal effect, precisely the same as paying it when due 
without interest. 'The policy reason for this rule is that, because of the delay, the debtor has 
the beneficial use of monies that do not belong to him, while the creditor is denied the 
beneficial use of those same monies to v/hich it is legally entitled.'" Vali Convalescent & 
Care Inst, v. Division of Health Care Fin . 797 P.2d 438, 445 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (quoting 
Boards of Educ. v. Salt Lake County Comm'n. 749 P.2d 1264, 1267 (Utah 1988)). Mont 
Trucking, Inc. v. Entrada Industries, Inc., Interstate Brick Div., 802 P.2d 779, 782 n.l (Utah 
App.,1990); See Baker v. Dataphase. Inc.. 781 F.Supp. 724,731 (D.Utahl992) (Under Utah 
law, pre-judgment interest represents an amount awarded as damages due to the defendants' 
delay in tendering an amount clearly owing under an agreement or other obligation.). 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING APPELLEE AS THE 
"PREVAILING PARTY" AND AWARDING HIM ATTORNEYS FEES AND 
COSTS, 
The trial court erred in determining Labrum the prevailing party and awarding him 
attorneys' fees. The Asset Purchase Agreement contains the following attorneys' fees 
provision at Section 11.10: 
Attorneys Fees. In the event any action or proceeding is taken or 
brought by either Party concerning this Agreement, the prevailing party 
shall be entitled to recover its costs and reasonable attorneys' fees, 
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whether such sums are expended with or without suit, at trial, on appeal 
or in any bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding. 
(R-416). In its August 8, 2006, verbal Ruling from the bench, the trial court stated, t%[t]he 
Court reserves the issue of attorney's fees to allow the parties to brief the question of who 
is the prevailing party in light of prior settlements of some claims and the Court's judgment 
entered today. . . ." (R-674, p. 199:12-15). After each side had submitted their briefs, the 
trial court erroneously determined that Labrum was the prevailing party based upon the 
misleading fact that "Labrum prevailed on all litigated claims." (R-636). While it is true that 
Labrum did prevail on all litigated claims, relying on that misleading fact misguided the trial 
court's analysis. 
The term "prevailing party" is defined as "a party in whose favor a judgment is 
rendered." A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Guv, 2002 UT App 734 11,47 P-3d 
92 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1145 (7th Edition 1999)). As such, "a party . . . is not 
a prevailing party until after a determination on the merits is made by either a jury or a trial 
court judge." J.V. Hatch Constr., Inc. v. Campros, 971 P.2d 8, 13 (Utah Ct.App.1998) 
(emphasis omitted), and "[w]here a contract... provides for attorneys fees to the prevailing 
party, a party does not even become entitled to such fees until the jury has determined which 
party has prevailed in the case." Meadowbrook, LLC v. Flower, 959 P.2d 115, 117 (Utah 
1998). 
The Utah Court of Appeals outlined the methodologies trial courts should consider 
when determining which party was the prevailing party. See A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing 
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and Heating v. Guv, 2002 UT App 73, 47 P.3d 92. The net judgment rule is "a good starting 
point in making determinations of which party prevailed." Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Sav. 
Bank v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217, 221 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). The net judgment rule requires 
consideration of all contractual claims within the context of a litigation. See, e.g., Stichtmg 
Mayflower Recreational Foods v. Newpark Resources, Inc., 917 F.2d 1239, 1248 (10th Cir. 
1990) (interpreting Utah law and stating "because the contract disputes in this case all arose 
out of the same transaction, the court should consider all of the contract claims together in 
making a determination of who is the prevailing party."); Trayner v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 
858 (Utah 1984) (A party is entitled only to those fees attributable to the successful 
vindication of contractual rights within the terms of their agreement.) 
Coet asserts that there are essentially two monetary awards to be considered in 
determining the prevailing party for purposes of the attorneys' fees provision in the Asset 
Sale Agreement. Pursuant to the trial court's order, many causes of action and accounting 
issues were resolved by the Accounting Team. The Accounting Team determined that 
Labrum owed Coet $59,3 84.79. The second sum is derived from the trial proceedings in this 
matter on August 8, 2006, in which the trial court found judgment against Coet and for 
Labrum in the amount of $11,455.26. These two figures result in a net judgment of 
$47,929.53 in the favor of Coet 
Coet successfully vindicated his contractual rights before the Accounting Team. As 
such, the trial court should have considered all of the claims together in making a 
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determination that Coet is the prevailing party. Using the net judgment rule yields the 
following net judgment in favor of Coet: 
Amount awarded to Coet by Accounting Team: $59,384.79 
Amount awarded to Labrum at Trial: $11,455.26 
Net Judgment in favor of Coet: $47,929.53 
The amount awarded by the Accounting Team should be considered as part of the net 
judgment. The Accounting Teams' findings were the equivalent of a summary judgment 
finding against Labrum. Utah courts regularly make attorneys' fees awards based on the net 
judgment rule after summary judgment proceedings. See, e.g., Stichting. 917 F.2d at 1248-
49 (discussing prevailing party and noting defendant's success on certain claims at summary 
judgment); Leonard v. Sunset Morg. Co.. L.R. Civ. No. 1:CV92BSJ, 2005 WL 977075 (D. 
Utah April 26, 2005) (awarding plaintiffs' attorneys' fees based on grant of summary 
judgment). That the result was reached by an Accounting Team, and not by the trial court 
should make no difference for purposes of calculating the net judgment. 
The Utah Appellate Court in A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing matter, recognized the 
need for a flexible and reasoned approach to deciding in particular cases who actually is the 
prevailing party. A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Guv, 2002 UT App 73, ^[15, 
47 P.3d 92. The trial court refused to consider the amount awarded by the accounting team 
in determining the prevailing party under the net judgment rule, the trial court should have 
considered it under the "flexible and reasoned approach." The "flexible and reasoned 
approach" recognizes that "mechanical application of... the net judgment rule could create 
absurd results." A.K.& R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Guv, 2004 UT 47, f 11, 94 
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P.3d 270, 274 (Utah 2004). Implicit in the approach is the "notion that courts should not 
ignore common sense when deciding which party prevailed." Id. 
One important factor under the "flexible and reasoned approach" is "comparative 
victory." For example, in Mountain States Broadcasting v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 558 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989), in determining the prevailing party, the court emphasized the fact that one 
party had won more than four times what the other party won. Here, Coet's award from the 
accounting team was almost six times the amount that Labrum received at trial. 
Another important factor is the amount awarded versus the amount sought. In this 
litigation, Coet sought $63,086.65 for the new and used car inventory. The Accounting 
Team awarded Coet $59,384.79. Thus, Coet recovered a significant portion of the amount 
it sought. 
Moreover, it would create an "absurd result" to "ignore common sense" and conclude 
that a party that prevails on a claim for nearly $ 11,000.00 has prevailed over a party that won 
almost $60,000.00 earlier in the same litigation. The "flexible and reasoned approach" 
renders Coet the prevailing party and entitles it its fees. 
Coet would have been determined the prevailing party had the trial court appropriately 
used the flexible and reasoned approach. Coet brought certain legal and accounting-type 
claims before the trial court. The trial court issued an order to resolve the accounting issues 
as determined by the Accounting Team, thus saving the expense of having to get experts, 
have them investigate, conduct an accounting and then have them present evidence through 
examination and cross-examination. By appointing the Accounting Team to resolve the 
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accounting issues, through unanimity, the trial court was involved in the supervision, 
methodology and areas of attention of the Accounting Team. Unlike typical settlements, in 
this matter, the trial court cannot say that it did not know why the parties settled that portion 
of the case before it. The trial court knew exactly why and for what amount the parties 
settled and could in good faith and legitimacy include the non-litigated result in its 
determination of the prevailing party. The flexible and reasoned approach allows the trial 
court to use its discretion to determine the prevailing party. Coet prevailed overwhelmingly 
in the final analysis of the matters originally brought before the trial court. 
Accordingly, under both the net judgment rule and the flexible and reasoned approach, 
Coet is the prevailing party in this matter. As a result, Appellant is entitled to recover its 
attorneys' fees and costs in this action. 
Additionally, an important public policy is adversely affected with the trial court's 
holding. The trial court provided its general analysis regarding the difficulty of determining 
the prevailing party when partial settlements occur without the trial court' s involvement. The 
trial court typically would not know the rationale or basis for the parties for settling. (R-636-
637). The important and main distinction in this matter is the reason and the process with 
which the settlement of non-litigated issues were resolved. Importantly, the trial court 
directed, ordered and supervised the non-litigated resolution of some of the claims pled 
between the litigants. The parties did not settle claims before the suit was filed. They did 
not settle claims absent the court's direction or involvement. Only after (1) the parties filed 
against each other; (2) the court ordered them to select a team of accountants; (3) to resolve 
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the expressly specified "accounting-type claims;" and (4) which unanimous agreement was 
binding; did the parties enter into the Letter Agreement and follow the trial court's order. 
It is misleading and incorrect to describe and compare the use of the court-ordered 
Accounting Team in this specific form of alternative dispute resolution, with general 
arbitration, mediation, or negotiation. In discussing the furtherance of alternative dispute 
resolution to litigation of claims, this Court held it, 
agree[d] with these courts that it is good public policy to encourage exploration 
of alternative dispute resolution methods by allowing the prevailing party to 
recover costs so incurred. Without such a rule, parties may well be disinclined 
to seriously explore these avenues. . . 
Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.. 1999 UT App 80, ^  38,977 P.2d 508. Other jurisdictions 
addressing similar issues have all held that a court should consider what occurred in the 
alternative dispute resolution forums when determining the prevailing party. See Martineau 
v. City of Concord New Hampshire. Civ. No. 93-268-M, 1994 U.S. Dist. Lexis 15801, at 
*11-12, 1994 WL 587832, at *4 (D.N.H. Oct. 24, 1994) (awarding prevailing party costs 
expended in connection with mediation efforts); Gibson v. Bobroff. 49 Cal.App.4th 1202, 
57 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 239 (1996) (holding court has discretion to award necessary expenses 
incurred from unsuccessful court-ordered mediation to prevailing party); Ledbetterv. Todd, 
418 So.2d 1116,1117 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1982) (holding trial court erred in refusing to award 
plaintiff costs incurred from mandatory medical mediation). The trial court was the primary 
influence to use the Accounting Team and was privy to the Accounting Team's Accountant's 
Findings. It is appropriate for this Court to overturn the trial court's holding as Labium as 
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the prevailing party and direct the trial court to consider the non-litigated outcomes in 
determining the prevailing party. 
Utah courts favor alternative methods of dispute resolution and the efficient use of the 
court's time and resources. Failure to reverse this decision will only alert litigants that it is 
to their detriment to use even court-ordered, directed, and supervised alternative methods of 
dispute resolution when a litigant has an attorneys' fees clause or statute and has a strong 
case against the opposing party. The litigant will not risk losing fees to allow anyone but an 
Article III judge to determine the matter at trial and receive an award of attorneys' fees, costs 
and pre-judgment interest. To act otherwise, if the trial court's decision is not overturned, 
would ensure the loss of attorneys' fees, costs, and pre-judgment interest. 
IV, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT APPELLANT 
OWED APPELLEE FOR OBSOLETE PARTS AND USED VEHICLE 
INVENTORY. 
The trial court err in its determination regarding its conclusions as to the legal effect 
of the set of found facts in the matter. The trial court's legal conclusions based upon the 
recognized facts lack correctness and must be reversed. 
A. Labrum Failed to Meet the Evidentiary Standard and the Elements of 
Fraud, Relative to the Parts Inventory. 
The trial court erred when it misapplied the facts, undisputed, admitted and established 
to Labium's claim of fraud regarding the parts inventory of the dealership sale. The elements 
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of fraud6 are well established. 
The trial court found in its findings of facts that, on November 12, 2001, Coet, 
Labium, Labium's brother, and sister-in-law, conducted a physical inventory of the parts 
owned by the dealership. (R-674, p. 194:1-19). Section 1.2 of the Asset Sale Agreement 
stated in part, "[bjased upon a physical inventory of Parts taken immediately prior to the 
closing, if the value of the then existing parts is less than 568,000.00, the Purchase Price will 
be reduced to reflect the difference between $68,000.00 and valuation of the inventoned 
parts and accessories . . ." (R-Pl. Ex. 1; 433). After several hours of conducting the 
November 12, 2001, parts inventory, but prior to its conclusion, Labrum declared he was 
satisfied there was more than $68,000.00 in the parts inventory. (R-674, pp. 194:4-19; 7:1-3). 
Immediately, thereafter (the same night), Labrum executed a document prepared by Coet 
attesting to Labium's satisfaction that at least $68,000.00 of parts inventory existed. (R-351). 
The following day, at the closing of the dealership purchase, Labrum signed closing 
documents that also attested to Labrum's satisfaction that there was at least $68,000.00 in the 
parts inventory. (R-Pl. Ex.2). 
6
 The elements of a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation are:(l) a representation; (2) 
concerning a presently existing material fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the representor 
either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient 
knowledge upon which to base such representation; (5) for the purpose of inducing the other 
party to act upon it; (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; 
(7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to act; (9) to his injury and damage. 
Larsen v. Exclusive Cars. Inc.. 2004 UT App 259 If 7, 97 P.3d 714. 
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The trial court held that Labrum relied to his detriment on Coet's "misrepresentation" 
that Coet did not have on obsolete part problem. (R-674, pp. 194:19-23 and 197:10-198:11). 
It appears that the court relied upon Rachel Labrum's testimony, 
A. I didn't at the time even know what obsolete meant. I 
remember afterwards asking Danny what that meant, and he told me 
what obsolete parts were, but I just remember them - Danny 
saying, "Do we have obsolete parts, " and Larry saying there 
wasn't a problem. We didn't - 1 don't remember details about 
looking at - - we didn't get papers on obsolete parts or anything. 
(R-674, p. 113:11-16). The trial court held that the elements of fraud were met by Coet's 
statement7, and that Labrum relied upon that single statement was induced to sign the closing 
statement without an obsolete parts adjustment. (R-674, p. 198:14-16). The issue on appeal 
is whether the trial court erred in its legal conclusion based upon the facts, that Labrum acted 
reasonably or not in relying upon Coet's statement. Typically, the question of reasonable 
reliance is a question of fact, however, there are instances where courts may conclude that 
as a matter of law, there was no reasonable reliance. See Gold Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil 
Co., 915 P.2d 1060, 1067 (Utah 1996). Notwithstanding (1) Labrum's experience in a 
dealership's parts department and being involved in a comptrollers position in a dealership 
in Phoenix, Arizona (R-674, p. 135:3-6); (2) Labrum's own physical and literal inventory of 
the dealership's parts; (3) the two separate documents signed days apart, by Labrum attesting 
to his satisfaction that at there was at least $68,000.00 worth of parts in the parts inventory; 
7
 The elements of fraud must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Republic 
Group, Inc. v. Won-Door Corp.. 883 P.2d 285, 292 (Utah App. 1994) (citing Andalex 
Resources. Inc., v. Myers. 871 P.2d 1041, 1046-1047 (Utah App. 1994)). 
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and (4) the lack of evidence which rose to the requisite standard of proof at trial, the trial 
court awarded Labium $11,455.26 for alleged obsolete parts in the inventory. The trial 
court's conclusions as to the legal effect of the established set of facts fails to meet the 
standard for correctness and is clearly erroneous. Bonneville Distributing Co. v. Green River 
Development Associates. Inc.. 2007 UT App 175, f 18, — P.3d —-, 2007 WL 1500822. 
Coet appeals the trial court's ruling regarding the alleged obsolete parts. Labium, 
pursuant to the Asset Sale Agreement, conducted the physical inventory, signed two different 
documents and offered testimony contrary to the facts of the matter. Coet seeks the 
SI 1,455.26, plus interest, to be returned to Coet 
B. Labrum Failed to Present Sufficient Competent Evidence to Show that He 
Had Purchased the Subject 1992 Ford Pickup With The Other Used 
Vehicle Inventory. 
After the Accounting Team provided their Evaluation Letter, the trial court ruled that 
only three narrow issues remained to be tried before it. (R-639). One of the issues was 
whether Labrum owed Coet for a 1992 Ford pickup truck. (R-639; R-674, p. 196:4-6). The 
trial court held that, "[tjhis issue turns on whether the truck was, quote cin the seller's 
inventory at the time of closing and previously titled.5" (R-674, p. 196:6-8). The trial court 
concluded that the 1992 Ford pickup was in the seller's inventory at the time of closing. . . 
and that it was a previously titled vehicle. (R-674, p. 196:14-16). The trial court held that 
Labrum paid Coet $290,275 at closing and has no further obligation to him." (R-674, p. 
196:18-19; PI. Ex. 10). 
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There is no dispute that the 1992 Ford pickup was on the dealership lot and included 
in the inventory paperwork. On November 8, 2001, less than one week before the closing, 
Mr. Gary Robinson purchased a new truck from Coet. The purchase included a trade of a 
1991 Chevy pickup. (R-674, 193:4-12). A week before the closing, Coet agreed to allow 
a customer, Johnny Jessen, to exchange his 1992 Ford pickup for the 1991 Chevy pickup Mr. 
Robinson was trading in and Coet agreed to pay the $2,300 balance on the 1991 Chevy 
pickup. (R-674, 67:14-25). Mr. Jessen would get the 1991 Chevy at the time he delivered 
the 1992 Ford pickup to Coet. (R-674,193:13-14). On November 13,2001, at 6:00 a.m. Mr. 
Jessen delivered the 1992 Ford pickup to the dealership, with the keys and title and drove 
away with Mr. Robinson's 1991 Chevypickup. (R-674, 85: 13-23; 193:15-25). On or about 
December 12, 2001,Coet issued a check for $2,300 to pay off a lien on some vehicle. (R-
674, p.l95:16-17; R-Pl. Ex. 11; R-674, pp. 40:21-41:12). In January 2002 Labrum sold the 
1992 Ford pickup to Carl Givens for $5,000.00. (R-674, p. 61:19-24). 
It is undisputed by the parties that the total of the used car inventory paid by Labrum, 
was $290,275. (R-674, p. 38:24 - 39:13; R-Pl. Ex. 2; R-353). The triahcourt found that the 
parties agreed the value of the used vehicle inventory was $290,275.00. (R-674, p. 196:16-
18). What is disputed by Coet is that the evidence fails to establish that the 1992 Ford Truck 
should have been included in the used vehicle inventory Labrum purchased in the Asset Sale 
Agreement. It is undisputed that Labrum had an opportunity to inspect the used vehicle 
inventory, take notes and then negotiate with Coet over the price of each individual car. (R-
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674, pp. 35:21-36:11). The negotiations were memorialized by a certain list of cars with 
prices, descriptions and Labium's handwriting. (PL Ex. 10). 
On Plaintiffs Exhibit 10, every vehicle/entry has a handwritten figure to the side of 
the computer generated figure, but one. The entry for the 1992 Ford pickup does not have 
a handwritten bid by it. (R-Pl. Ex. 10). Labrum testified that the hand-written figures in 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 10 was made by him. (R-674, pp. 147:12-148:6 and 153:3-6). Coet 
testified that he never negotiated with Labrum over the purchase price of the 1992 Ford 
pickup. In fact, Coet had never seen the pickup. Coet testified, 
Q. Was there any discussion about that particular vehicle? 
A. No. I never saw the vehicle. I've never seen it to this day. 
Q. Has Mr. Labrum paid you any portion of the purchase price for that 
vehicle? 
A. No. 
Q. Notwithstanding your dealership paid off a lien that didn't encumber that 
vehicle, but paid off a lien that allowed Mr. Robinson to get free title - or clear 
title to the trade in; is that correct? 
A. Correct. 
(R-674, p. 40:2-15). Notwithstanding Labrum's testimony that he did inspect and listed the 
1992 Ford pickup on his own list (Df. Ex. 4), and that he purchased all of Coef s used vehicle 
inventory (R-674, p. 155:20-25), Labrum testified that it was Plaintiffs Exhibit 2 that he 
relied upon at the closing. (R-674, p. 156:11-19). Importantly, adding up Labrum's hand-
written figures contained on Plaintiffs Exhibit 10, amounts to 5290,275. That is the exact 
amount which Labrum agreed to pay Coet in the closing documents and ultimately paid to 
Coet. (PI. Ex. 2). 
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Additionally, Labrum's claim that he inspected the pickup truck and entered on his 
own worksheet (Defendant's Exhibit 4), included that the total sale price for the used vehicle 
inventory was in excess of $295,000,00. (R-674, p. 154:15-21). Labrum's testimony that 
the amount on the document he created was $5,000.00 more than the used vehicle inventory 
figures on both of Plaintiff s Exhibits 2 and 10, indicate that, Labrum's documents support 
Coet's claim that he was owed by Labrum for the 1992 Ford pickup. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, as the detailed analysis above makes clear, the trial court erred on 
several issues in the resolution of the disputes between Coet and Labrum. The trial court 
erred in its holding that: Coet waived his right to attorneys' fees, costs and pre-judgment 
interest in the Accountants Evaluation Agreement; Labrum was the "prevailing party" at the 
conclusion of the bench trial; Labrum's detrimental reliance on Coet's remark regarding the 
obsolete parts and the determination of the ownership issue relative to the 1992 Ford pickup. 
Coet respectfully request that this Court reverse and remand with instructions to the 
trial court to enter an order: (1) for an award to Coet for his attorneys' fees and costs; and/or 
(2) for an award to Coet for pre-judgment interest on his award determined by the 
Accounting Team; and/or (3) holding Coet as the prevailing party regarding the entire matter; 
and/or (4) find that Labrum failed t meet the elements and standard of proof for fraud relative 
to the parts inventory obsolescence and for the trial court to reconsider the ownership status 
of the 1992 Ford pickup. 
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Respectfully submitted this 12th day of June, 2007. 
^^v,*f 7fA 
GARY R. HOWE 
THOMAS B. PRICE 
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH 
Zions Bank Building, Suite 900 
10 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Attorneys for Appellant Larry J. Coet Chevrolet, 
Pontiac, Buick, Inc. 
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Asset Sale Agreement 
i 
THIS ASSET SALE AGREEMENT (this "Agreement") is made effective this 
day of August, 2001 between LARRY J. COET CHEVROLET, PONTIAC, BUICK, INC., a 
Utah corporation, whose address is 901 South Main, Heber City, Utah 84032 ("Seller"); and 
LABRUM CHEVROLET PONTIAC BUICK, INC., a Utah corporation, whose address is 
2003 West Brynn Circle, West Jordan, Utah 84088, ("Buyer"). 
R E C I T A L S : 
A. Seller is the owner of certain assets used in the operation of "Larry J. Coet 
Chevrolet, Pontiac, Buick," a new and used motor vehicle dealership located at 901 South Main, 
Heber City, Wasatch County, Utah. The Dealership is operated under a dealer agreement with 
General Motors Corporation ("Manufacturer"). 
B. Seller desires to sell to Buyer, and Buyer desires to purchase from Seller, certain 
assets of Seller, subject to the terms and conditions of this Agreement. 
C. The parties desire to set forth herein their entire agreement concerning the 
purchase of non real property assets. This Agreement shall supersede all prior negotiations or 
agreements between the parties, oral and/or written, concerning the subject matter of this 
Agreement. 
AGREEMENT: 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises, the mutual covenants and 
undertakings of the parties hereto, and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and 
sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto agree as follows: 
ARTICLE 1 
SALE AND PURCHASE OF THE ASSETS 
Section 1.1. Assets to be Purchased and Sold. The assets (the "Assets") to be purchased 
and sold hereunder relate to the Dealership and shall include, the following: 
(a) New Vehicle Inventory. Seller's new automobile and truck inventory (the 
"New Vehicle Inventory") as of the Closing (defined below), which shall include only those 
new motor vehicles that have never been titled; that are considered new and unused in the 
automobile sales industry; and whose ownership is evidenced by a Manufacturer's Statement of 
Origin (an "MSO"). New Vehicle Inventory may include demonstrators only if undamaged with 
odometer readings not exceeding Three Thousand (3,000) miles. 
(b) Used Vehicle Inventory. All used motor vehicles which are in the Seller's 
inventory at the time of Closing which vehicles have been previously titled. The used motor 
vehicle inventory may include demonstrators if such demonstrators have been titled or have 
odometer readings greater than Three Thousand (3,000) miles. 
(c) Sublet & Supplies. Sublet, gas, oil, grease, etc., shall be purchased as an 
inventory item at current values, based upon a physical inventory which shall be taken 
immediately prior to the Closing. No unusable or partially used items shall be purchased by 
Buyer. 
(d) Parts and Accessories Inventory. The motor vehicle parts and accessories 
inventory (the "Parts") of the Seller established by physical count as of the Closing, excluding 
any and all obsolete parts. Obsolete parts ("Obsolete Parts") shall consist of the following: (1) 
any part which is not included in the subject manufacturer's current parts pricing list; (2) any part 
on which the seal has been opened or is materially damaged in any way; (3) any part which is 
missing a portion or portions of its working mechanism(s) so that it would not be accepted for 
return by its manufacturer; or (4) Parts in excess of a one hundred eighty (180) day supply. The 
Parts may include motor vehicle parts and accessories manufactured or sold by Manufacturer as 
well as those manufactured or sold by Manufacturer's distributors or other reputable third party 
suppliers. 
(e) FF&E. The furniture, fixtures, tools and equipment (collectively, the 
"FF&E") to be purchased by Buyer that are specified on attached Exhibit "A." Upon request 
prior to Closing, Seller shall provide Buyer with all documentation and information in Seller's 
possession or reasonably available to Seller evidencing the items and original costs for such 
items. Buyer shall be entitled to take a physical inventory of the FF&E to assure that all such 
items are accounted for and functional as of the Closing; provided, however, that no item shall be 
omitted from the FF&E to be purchased by Buyer unless such item is designated as "Assets Not 
Subject to the Asset Sale Agreement" as set forth on Exhibit "B." The FF&E must be in good 
condition and good working condition, as the case may be. 
(f) Intangibles. The following intangible assets (the "Intangibles") of the 
Seller: goodwill; the opportunity to acquire the dealer agreements with Manufacturer; the 
opportunity to obtain the Seller's present telephone number(s) and Yellow Pages advertisements; 
and the opportunity to acquire from Manufacturer any specialized displays used in connection 
with the business of Seller. 
(g) Real Estate. Dealership real estate located at 901 South Main, Heber City, 
Utah 84032, shall be purchased by DRL Real Estate, L.L.C., simultaneously with the Closing. 
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Section 1.2 Purchase Price for the Assets, The purchase price (the "Purchase 
Price") for the Assets shall be Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($350,000.00), as may be 
adjusted at Closing pursuant to the terms of this Agreement. 
(a) New Vehicle Inventory. An inventory of new vehicles of the Dealership 
shall be completed immediately prior to Closing. The actual cash value of new vehicles shall be 
the dealer cost of such vehicle less manufacturer holdback advertising allowances, and/or 
incentives received or due and payable on said vehicles. The manufacturer holdback advertising 
allowances, and/or incentives received, or due and payable on the New Vehicle Inventory shall 
remain the property of the Seller. Any additional equipment (add-ons) that have been installed at 
dealer cost less any items at dealer cost that have been removed from said vehicles, shall be 
added to or subtracted from the actual cash value of the New Vehicles. Buyer shall purchase the 
New Vehicle Inventory at its actual cash value by paying said actual cash value of the New 
Vehicle Inventory to Seller's flooring source at Closing. 
(b) Parts. Based upon a physical inventory of Parts taken immediately prior to 
the Closing, if the value of the then existing Parts is less than $68,000.00 , the Purchase Price 
will be reduced to reflect the difference between $68,000.00 and valuation of the inventoried 
parts and accessories. The Parts shall be valued at the listed price in the current price book for 
Parts provided that said inventoried Parts are still in the original, unopened factory packaging 
and are not Obsolete Parts. New, undamaged, returnable jobber Parts will be purchased based 
upon the same criteria, priced at the current price book. The Parts physical inventory shall be 
conducted at a time immediately prior to Closing by representatives of the Seller and Buyer. If a 
resolution of the valuation of the Parts cannot be achieved then in that event an independent third 
party appraiser mutually acceptable to the parties shall be engaged by the parties whose valuation 
shall be binding on the parties. The cost of such shall be paid equally by the parties. The Parts 
inventory (and the value thereof) as determined as of the Parts inventory date shall be increased 
or decreased, as appropriate, to reflect purchases and sales of Parts from the Parts inventory date 
to the date of Closing. 
(c) Used Vehicle Inventory. An inventory of the used vehicles of the Seller shall 
be completed immediately prior to Closing. Used motor vehicles shall be valued at a mutually 
agreed upon price by Buyer and Seller as of the date of Closing using as a starting point the 
wholesale Kelly Blue Book with "Options" valuation pertaining to such vehicles. If the parties 
are not in agreement with the valuation as indicated in the Kelly Blue Book with Options 
guidelines, then in that event, the parties shall select an independent third-party appraiser 
mutually acceptable to the parties who shall appraise the used vehicles in question at their actual 
cash value and the valuation rendered by such third-party appraiser shall be binding upon the 
parties regarding the purchase price of such vehicles. The cost of such a third-party appraisal 
shall be borne equally by the parties. Buyer shall purchase the Used Vehicle Inventory at its 
actual cash value by paying said actual cash value of the Used Car Inventory to Seller's flooring 
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source at Closing. The Asset Purchase Price will be increased or decreased depending upon 
whether the value of the used cars purchased exceeds or is less than the inventory value on the 
books of Seller. 
(d) FF&E. The furniture, fixtures, tools and equipment (Exhibit "A") shall be 
purchased based upon an inventory and valuation conducted by Buyer and Seller. If any item(s) 
set forth in Exhibit "A" are not part of the FF&E closing inventory conducted immediately prior 
to Closing then a valuation shall be attributed to such item(s) and deducted from the purchase 
price. 
(e) Purchase of New and Used Vehicle Inventory. The Buyer shall purchase 
the New and Used Vehicle Inventory but only up to a maximum of $1,500,000.00, or greater as 
may be agreed upon by the parties and Buyer's lender, holding the Seller harmless therefrom. 
(f) Termination Rights. Seller hereby assigns to Buyer Seller's termination 
rights under its dealer agreements with Manufacturer, pursuant to which Buyer may have the 
right to return to Manufacturer all unwanted parts purchased by Buyer pursuant to this 
agreement. In that regard, the parties acknowledge that Manufacturer has made available to its 
authorized dealers (including Seller) various incentive programs (the "Programs"), the intent of 
which is to encourage those dealers to use parts available through Manufacturer and to minimize 
the return of those parts. 
Section 1.3 Service Contract Programs. All liabilities and obligations of Seller 
pursuant to any extended service/warranty programs or the like (the "Service Contracts") 
offered by Seller or an affiliated entity (but not Manufacturer) to Seller's customers are Seller's 
sole responsibility, and Seller shall indemnify and hold harmless Buyer and its affiliated entities 
from and against all costs, damages, actions and liabilities relating to the same. Notwithstanding 
the foregoing, Buyer (at their sole option) may elect at the Closing to undertake in writing 
responsibility for all or part of the Service Contracts, in which case the Purchase Price for the 
Assets shall be reduced by an amount that is mutually acceptable to Buyer and to Seller and that 
reasonably reflects the liability so undertaken by Buyer. 
Section 1.4 Accounts Receivable, All accounts receivable (the "Accounts'1) of 
Seller as of the Closing shall be excluded from the terms and conditions of this Agreement and 
shall remain the sole property of Seller. Following the Closing, Buyer shall cooperate with the 
then-owner of the Accounts to facilitate realization by such owner of the sums represented by the 
Accounts. 
Section 1.5 Accounts Payable. All liabilities and accounts payable of Seller shall 




Section 1.6 Statements of Origin. At the Closing, Seller shall provide and deliver to 
Buyer an MSO for each vehicle in the New Vehicle Inventory, free and clear of all liens and 
encumbrances whatsoever and titles for each used vehicle free and clear of all liens and 
encumbrances whatsoever. The total purchase price for the New and Used Vehicle Inventory 
shall not exceed One Million Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($1,500,000), unless otherwise 
agreed by the parties and Buyer's lender in writing. 
ARTICLE 2 
PAYMENT OF THE PURCHASE PRICE 
Section 2.1 Payment of the Purchase Price, The Purchase Price for the Assets as set 
forth in Article 1 shall be paid as follows: 
(a) Cash payment of Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars 
($350,000.00) as adjusted pursuant to the terms of this 
Agreement. 
(b) Earnest Money Deposit. The Buyers shall deliver to Snow, 
Christensen & Martineau for deposit in the law firm's trust 
account the sum of $5,000.00 at the time of the execution 
of this Agreement. If the transaction set forth in this 
agreement fails to close pursuant to the terms and 
conditions of this Agreement, by virtue of the defalcation 
or breach of the Agreement by the Seller, then and in that 
event, the Earnest Money Deposit shall be refunded to the 
Buyers in total. However, if the Closing of this Agreement 
does not proceed as a result of Buyers' defalcation or 
breach, then and in that event, $5,000.00 of the Earnest 
Money Deposit shall be delivered to the Seller as liquidated 
damages with no further claim against the Buyers. 
ARTICLE 3 
LIABILITIES 
Section 3.1 Buyer Assumption of Liabilities. As of the Closing, the Buyer shall 
assume responsibility for and pay the following liabilities of Seller: 
(a) Maintenance and Lease Agreements. From and after the date of Closing, 
the Buyer shall assume and pay all maintenance agreements, service agreements and lease 
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agreements relating to items included in the FF&E as set forth in Exhibit UC" attached hereto, to 
the extent Buyer has agreed to such assumption within forty five (45) days after Seller has made 
available to Buyer full and complete copies of all such maintenance, service and lease 
agreements. From and after the Closing, Buyer shall indemnify and hold Seller harmless from 
and against any and all claims, actions, proceedings, damages, costs and fees, (including 
reasonable attorney's fees) arising from, or in any way attributable, to Buyer's failure to pay or 
otherwise satisfy the terms and conditions of the maintenance agreements, service agreements 
and/or lease agreements as set forth in Exhibit C, which Buyer has agreed in writing to assume. 
Seller shall obtain all written consents to assignments as required and shall pay any fees or 
penalties related to such assignments. 
Section 3.2 Other Liabilities. Except those liabilities specifically assumed by the 
Buyer pursuant to section 3.1 above, the Seller shall be responsible for and pay all obligations 
and liabilities of the Seller, including but not limited to all liens and encumbrances of every kind 
against the Assets and any other obligations, liabilities or claims by Seller's creditors which were 
accrued and matured prior to the time of Closing. Under certain circumstances some liabilities 
may be pro-rated between the parties as they agree in writing. 
ARTICLE 4 
DEALER AGREEMENT 
Seller represents and warrants to Buyer that Seller operates the dealership under a dealer 
agreement (the "Dealer Agreement") with Manufacturer, and that the Dealer Agreement is 
current, in good standing and is not subject to cancellation or modification by reason of non-
performance by Seller. Seller is not aware of any conditions or facts which would prevent the 
issuance of a new dealer agreement (the "New Dealer Agreement") to one or more of the 
parties constituting Buyer on comparable terms as the existing Dealer Agreement. The issuance 
to Buyer by Manufacturer of the New Dealer Agreement is a condition precedent to the 
consummation of the terms of this Agreement and Buyer's obligation to perform hereunder. 
Within two weeks immediately following Buyer's payment to Seller of the Earnest Money 
Deposit (as described in section 2. 1 (a) above), Buyer shall file an application (and all related 
papers reasonably known by Buyer to be required in connection with such application) with 
Manufacturer for a New Dealer Agreement, which application shall present such individuals 
(including, without limitation, their expertise and financial resources) in the best possible light. 
Buyer shall diligently and expeditiously pursue approval of such application by Manufacturer, 
and shall use Buyer's best, good faith efforts to have the New Dealer Agreement issued by 1 
November 2001. Seller hereby informs Buyer that, to Seller's best knowledge, Manufacturer's 
standard procedures for approval of new dealer agreements typically require between sixty (60) 




CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO CLOSING 
Section 5.1 Conditions of Buyer's Obligation to Close, Buyer's obligation to 
consummate the transactions contemplated by this Agreement and to make any payments is 
subject to the fulfillment (or the waiver thereof by Seller in writing) of the following conditions 
on or before the Closing: 
(a) Issuance of New Dealer Agreement. The New Dealer Agreement shall 
have been issued to Danny R. Labrum, or a designee appointed by the Buyer by Manufacturer 
under customary and usual terms and conditions generally contained in Manufacturer's standard 
Dealer Agreement. 
(b) Condition of Title. Buyer has been reasonably assured that Buyer will 
receive good, marketable and legal title to and right of possession of the Assets free and clear of 
all liens and encumbrances whatsoever. 
(c) Manufacturers' Parts Programs. Seller shall have assigned to Buyer, at 
Closing, its termination rights under the Dealer Agreement with Manufacturer and any and all of 
Seller's rights (to receive payments of money or otherwise) under the Manufacturer's Parts 
Programs. 
(d) Condition of Seller's Business. As of Closing, there shall not have been 
any material adverse change in Seller's business and prospects not contemplated as of the date of 
this Agreement. All representations made by Seller shall be essentially true, accurate and correct 
as of Closing and there shall be no breach of any warranties or covenants made hereunder by 
Seller. 
(e) Execution and Delivery of Documents. Seller shall have executed and 
delivered to Buyer, through escrow at Closing, any and all documents reasonably required to 
consummate the transactions contemplated by this Agreement. 
(f) Delivery of Records. Books. Etc. Seller shall have made available to Buyer 
such records and books relative to the Assets as Buyer reasonably may request to effect an 
orderly transfer of the Assets at time of Closing. 
(g) Delivery of Bills of Sale and/or Titles for the Assets. Seller shall have 
executed and delivered to Buyer, at time of Closing, appropriate bills of sale, assignments and 
other conveyance documents for the Assets, and shall execute and deliver appropriate documents 
as required by the respective flooring lenders to transfer the MSO for each of the vehicles in the 
New Vehicle Inventory and titles to the Used Vehicle Inventory to the Buyer or their assigns, all 
free and clear of all liens and encumbrances. 
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(h) No Opposition. No suit, action, or proceeding shall be pending or 
threatened at any time prior to or at the time of Closing before or by any court or governmental 
body (a) seeking to restrain or prohibit, or to obtain damages or other relief in connection with, 
the execution and delivery of this Agreement or the consummation of the transactions 
contemplated hereby; or (b) that might materially and adversely affect the business or properties 
or condition, financial or other, or results of operations of Seller. 
(i) Permits, Etc. Seller shall have assigned to Buyer, or Buyer shall have 
obtained, all such permits, licenses, approvals, authorizations, variances, agreements, and 
warranties from federal, state, and local governmental authorities, which Buyer shall, in the 
exercise of its sole discretion, deem necessary or desirable for the operation by Buyer of the 
business of Seller after the Closing. 
(j) Representations and Covenants. The representations and warranties of 
Seller contained in this Agreement or otherwise made in writing by Seller or on Seller's behalf 
pursuant hereto or otherwise made in connection with the transactions contemplated hereby shall 
be true and correct at and as of the Closing with the same force and effect as though made on and 
as of such date; each and all of the covenants, agreements, and conditions to be performed or 
satisfied by Seller hereunder at or prior to the Closing shall have been duly performed or 
satisfied; and Seller shall have furnished Buyer with such certificates and other documents 
evidencing the truth of such representations and warranties and the performance and satisfaction 
of such covenants, agreements, and conditions as Buyer shall have reasonably requested. 
(k) Instruments of Transfer. Seller shall have delivered to Buyer bills of sale, 
assignments, deeds, and other instruments of transfer and assignment in accordance with the 
provisions hereof, transferring to Buyer all of Seller's right, title, and interest in and to the 
Assets, including the assigned contracts, to be transferred, sold, assigned, and conveyed by Seller 
to Buyer pursuant to the provisions of this Agreement. The form of such instruments shall be 
satisfactory in all reasonable respects to Snow, Christensen & Martineau, counsel to Buyer. 
(1) Financing. Buyer shall have obtained from Zions Bank and the SBA 
financing in an amount and on terms and conditions satisfactory to Buyer, in its sole discretion. 
(m) Real Estate Closing. The Buyer and Seller shall have met ail requirements 
and simultaneously Close on the Real Estate pursuant to that certain Real Estate Purchase and 
Sale Agreement between Seller and DRL Real Estate, L.L.C., of even date herewith. 
Section 5.2 Conditions of Seller's Obligation to Close. Seller's obligation to 
consummate the transactions contemplated by this Agreement are subject to the fulfillment (or 
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the waiver thereof by Buyer in writing) of the following conditions on or before the Closing 
Date: 
(a) Compliance with Obligations. Buyer shall have materially complied with 
all of Buyer's obligations to be performed hereunder, including the payment of the Purchase 
Price, on or before Closing. 
(b) Buyer Representations. All representations made hereunder by Buyer 
shall be true, accurate and correct as of the Closing and there shall be no breach in the warranties 
or covenants made hereunder by Buyer. 
(c) Delivery of Documents. Buyer shall have executed and delivered to Seller 
any and all documents reasonably required to consummate the transactions contemplated by this 
Agreement. 
(d) Payment of Purchase Price. Buyer shall have paid to Seller, through 
escrow at Closing, the entire Purchase Price for the Assets as required pursuant to Article 2 of 
this Agreement 
ARTICLE 6 
REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES 
Section 6.1 Seller's Representations and Warranties. Seller hereby represents and 
warrants to Buyer as follows, and covenants that the same are true and accurate as of the date 
hereof and will remain true and accurate as of the Closing: 
(a) Ownership of the Assets. Seller is the owner of good and marketable title 
to the Assets; the Assets are (or will be at the Closing) free and clear of all liens, debts, adverse 
claims, obligations or encumbrances of every kind; and Seller has the unconditional right to sell, 
convey and transfer the Assets to Buyer as contemplated by this Agreement.-
(b) Binding Agreement. Upon execution and delivery hereof and at the 
Closing, this Agreement and the obligations contemplated herein shall be legal, valid and 
binding obligations of Seller and shall be enforceable against Seller in accordance with their 
respective terms. 
(c) Other Agreements. Except as herein otherwise provided, the execution 
and delivery of this Agreement and the consummation of the transactions provided for herein 
will not result in a material breach of any term or provision of, or constitute a default or permit 
acceleration of maturity under, any indenture, mortgage, deed of trust, security agreement, 




is a party or by which Seller is bound which would affect the Assets or prevent or impair the 
consummation of this Agreement or the transfer of the Assets to Buyer as contemplated herein. 
(d) Suits and Proceedings. There are no suits or proceedings pending or 
threatened in any court or before any administrative board, commission, or by any federal, state 
or other governmental department or agency, which directly or indirectly affect or involve Seller 
and (a) which would materially, adversely affect the Assets, or (b) which, if determined 
adversely, would have a material adverse effect on the transactions contemplated by this 
Agreement or the business prospects of the Dealership. 
(e) Third Party Approvals. Except as otherwise specified herein, no consents 
or approvals of any third party or parties are required prior to the execution, delivery and 
performance by Seller of this Agreement and the other documents contemplated hereby. 
(f) No Material Adverse Changes. Since the date of this Agreement and prior 
to the Closing, there has not and will not have been: 
(1) Any material adverse change in the Assets; 
(2) Any sale or any other disposition of any material part of the Assets 
except in the ordinary course of business of the Dealership; 
(3) Any damage, destruction, or casualty loss (not covered by 
insurance) materially and adversely affecting the Assets. 
(4) Any other material event or condition adversely affecting the 
Assets. 
(g) Taxes. All taxes, charges and assessments on the Assets or the Dealership 
of any type or character which have or will become due and payable prior to the Closing will 
have been paid in full by Seller on or prior to such date. 
(h) Defaults/Breaches. Seller has in all material respects complied with, 
observed and performed all of its obligations, and is not in default or breach (or would not be in 
default or breach with the lapse of time or the giving of notice or both) under, any agreement or 
commitment (oral or written) to which Seller is a party and by which the Assets are bound. 
(i) Organization and Corporate Power. Seller is a corporation duly 
organized, validly existing, and in good standing under the laws of its jurisdiction of 
incorporation and is duly qualified and in good standing as a foreign corporation in each other 
jurisdiction in which it owns or leases properties, conducts operations, or maintains a stock of 
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goods, with full power and authority (corporate and other) to carry on the business in which it is 
engaged and to execute and deliver and carry out the transactions contemplated by this 
Agreement. 
(j) Financial Statements, Seller has delivered to Buyer consolidated balance 
sheets of Seller as at the close of its fiscal year for each of the three years ending December 
1998, 1999 and 2000, respectively, and interim balance sheet for the six (6) months ending June 
30, 2001, together with related statements of operations, statements of changes in stockholders' 
equity, and statements of cash flows for the respective years then ended. 
The financial statements specified above, including in each case the notes to such 
financial statements, are hereinafter sometimes collectively referred to as the "Financial 
Statements." All of the Financial Statements are true, correct, and complete, have been prepared 
in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles consistently followed throughout 
the periods (except as set forth in such notes or statements) and fairly present the financial 
condition of Seller and the results of its operations as at the dates thereof and throughout the 
periods covered thereby. The Financial Statements reflect or provide for all claims against, and 
all debts and liabilities of, Seller, fixed or contingent, as at the dates thereof, and there has not 
been any change between the date of the most recent Financial Statements and the date of this 
Agreement that has materially or adversely affected the business or properties or condition or 
prospects, financial or other, or results of operations of Seller, and no fact or condition exists or 
is contemplated or threatened, which might cause any such change at any time in the future. 
(k) Personal Property, Seller owns and has good and marketable title to all 
the tangible and intangible Personal Property and assets, other than the assets referred to in the 
Exhibit C, reflected upon the most recent balance sheet included in the Financial Statements or 
used by Seller in its business if not so reflected, free and clear of all mortgages, liens, 
encumbrances, equities, claims, and obligations to other persons, of whatever kind and character, 
except as set forth in the Exhibit C. None of the fixed assets and machinery and equipment is 
subject to contracts of sale, and none is held by Seller as lessee or as conditional sales vender 
under any lease or conditional sales contract and none is subject to any title retention agreement, 
except as set forth in the Exhibit C. The fixed assets and machinery and equipment, taken as a 
whole, are in a state of good repair and maintenance and are in good operating condition; 
inventory is up to normal commercial standards and no inventory that is obsolete or 
unmarketable is reflected m the most recent balance sheets included in the Financial Statements. 
Upon the sale, assignment, transfer, and delivery of the Assets to Buyer hereunder, there will be 
vested in Buyer good and marketable title to the tangible and intangible personal property 
constituting a part thereof, free and clear of all mortgages, liens, encumbrances, equities, claims, 
and obligations to other persons, of whatever kind and character, except for the rights of third 
persons arising under contracts for the sale of inventory in the ordinary course of business, each 
of which is listed in the Exhibit C. 
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(1) Ordinary Course of Business. Seller, from the date of the balance sheet 
contained in the most recent Financial Statements to the date hereof, 
(1) has operated its business in the normal, usual, and customary 
manner in the ordinary and regular course of business; 
(2) has not sold or otherwise disposed of any of its properties or assets, 
other than inventory sold in the ordinary course of business; 
(3) except in each case in the ordinary course of business, 
(a) has not amended or terminated any outstanding lease, 
contract, or agreement, 
contingent, or other), and 
(b) has not incurred any obligations or liabilities (fixed, 
(c) has not entered any commitments; 
(4) has not made any transactions outside the ordinary course of 
business in its inventory or any additions to its property or any purchases of machinery or 
equipment, except for normal maintenance and replacements; 
(5) has not mortgaged, pledged, or subjected to lien or any other 
encumbrances, any of its assets, tangible or intangible; 
(6) has not sold or transferred any tangible asset or cancelled any debts 
or claims except in each case in the ordinary course of business; 
(7) has not entered into any other transaction or transactions that 
individually or in the aggregate are material to Seller, other than in the ordinary course of 
business. 
(m) Litigation and Compliance with Laws. Exhibit D contains a brief 
description of all litigation or legal or other actions, suits, proceedings, or investigations, at law 
or in equity, or before any federal, state, municipal, or other governmental department, 
commission, board, agency, or instrumentality, domestic or foreign, in which Seller or any of its 
officers or directors, in such capacity, is engaged, or, to the knowledge and belief of Seller, with 
which Seller or any of its officers or directors is threatened in connection with the business or 
affairs or properties or assets of Seller. Seller is in compliance with all laws and governmental 
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rules and regulations, domestic and foreign, and all requirements of insurance carriers, applicable 
to its business or affairs or properties or assets, including, without limitation, those relating to 
environmental protection, water or air pollution, and similar matters. 
(n) Environmental Matters. To the best of Seller's knowledge (but without 
having undertaken any independent inquiry), the Dealership and Property is not in violation of 
any federal, state or local law, ordinance or regulation relating to industrial hygiene or to the 
environmental conditions on, under or about the Property, including, but not limited to, soil and 
groundwater condition. During the time in which Seller has owned the Property, neither Seller 
nor, to the best of Seller's knowledge, any third party has released onto, under, about or from the 
Property any Hazardous Materials. For purposes of this Agreement, "Hazardous Materials" shall 
include substances defined as "hazardous substances," "hazardous materials," "hazardous 
wastes," "retrograde material," "contaminant," "pollutant," "toxic substances" or the like in the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, as amended, 
42 U.S.C. § 9601. et seq.; the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1901, et seq.; 
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901, et seq.; the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251, et seq.; the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401, et seq.; 
the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq.; the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (33 
U.S.C. § 2701 et seq.; the Occupational Safety and Health Act (29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.; the 
Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act (42 U.S.C. § 11001 et seq.); A.R.S. 
§ 549-201(16), 49-901(3), and 49-921(5); and in the regulations adopted pursuant to such laws; 
and any substance or material which has been determined by any state, federal or local 
governmental authority with jurisdiction over the Property to be capable of posing a risk of 
injury to health or safety. 
(o) Extraordinary Events. From the end of its most recent fiscal year to the 
date hereof, neither the business nor properties of the business have been materially and 
adversely affected in any way as the result of any fire, explosion, accident, casualty, labor 
disturbance, requisition, or taking of property by any governmental body or agency, flood, 
embargo, or Act of God or the public enemy, or cessation, interruption, or diminution of 
operations, whether or not covered by insurance. 
(p) Material Information. Neither the Financial Statements nor this 
Agreement (including the Schedules and Exhibits hereto) nor any certificate or other information 
or document furnished or to be furnished by either Seller to Buyer contains or will contain any 
untrue statement of a material fact or omits or will omit to state a material fact required to be 
stated herein or therein or necessary to make the statements herein or therein not misleading. 
(q) Continuing Representations. The representations and warranties of 
Seller herein contained (a) relating to non tax matters shall survive the Closing for a period of 
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one year and (b) relating to tax matters shall survive the Closing for the applicable statute of 
limitations. 
Section 6.2 Buyer's Representations and Warranties. Buyer hereby represents and 
warrants to Seller as follows, and covenants that the same are true and accurate as of the date 
hereof and will remain true and accurate as of the Closing Date: 
(a) Binding Agreement. Upon execution and delivery hereof and at the 
Closing, this Agreement and the obligations contemplated herein shall be legal, valid and 
binding obligations of the Buyer and shall be enforceable against Buyer in accordance with their 
respective terms. 
(b) Organization and Corporate Power. Buyer is a corporation duly 
organized, validly existing, and in good standing under the laws of its jurisdiction of 
incorporation and is duly qualified and in good standing as a foreign corporation in each other 
jurisdiction in which it owns or leases properties, conducts operations, or maintains a stock of 
goods, with full power and authority (corporate and other) to carry on the business in which it is 
engaged and to execute and deliver and carry out the transactions contemplated by this 
Agreement. 
(c) Due Authorization; Effect of Transaction. No provisions of the Certificate 
of Incorporation or Bylaws of Buyer, or of any agreement, instrument, or understanding, or any 
judgment, decree, rule, or regulation, to which Buyer is a party or by which Buyer is bound, has 
been or will be violated by the execution and delivery by Buyer of this Agreement or the 
performance or satisfaction of any agreement or condition herein contained upon its part to be 
performed or satisfied, and all requisite corporate and other authorizations for such execution, 
delivery, performance, and satisfaction have been duly obtained. Upon execution and delivery, 
this Agreement will be a legal, valid, and binding obligation of Buyer and Stockholder, 
enforceable in accordance with its terms. Buyer is not in default in the performance, observance, 
or fulfillment of any of the terms or conditions of its Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws. 
(d) Other Agreements. Except as herein otherwise provided, the execution and 
delivery of this Agreement and the consummation of the transactions provided for herein will not 
result in a material breach of any term or provision of, or constitute a default or permit 
acceleration of maturity under, any indenture, mortgage, deed of trust, security agreement, 
pledge agreement, loan agreement, or other agreement or instrument to which Buyer is a party 
or by which Buyer is bound which would impair the consummation of this Agreement. 
(e) Suits and Proceedings. There are no suits or proceedings pending or 
threatened in any court or before any administrative board, commission, or by any federal, state 
or other governmental department or agency, which directly or indirectly affect or involve Buyer 
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and which, if determined adversely, would have a material adverse effect on the transactions 
contemplated by this Agreement. 
(f) Defaults/Breaches. Buyer has in all material respects complied with, 
observed and performed all of its obligations, and is not in default or breach (or would not be in 
default or breach with the lapse of time or the giving of notice or both) under, any agreement or 
commitment (oral or written) to which Buyer is a party. 
ARTICLE 7 
CONDUCT OF SELLER'S BUSINESS PENDING THE CLOSING 
Section 7.1. Conduct of Seller's Business Pending the Closing. Pending the Closing, 
Seller will do the following: 
(a) Conduct of Business. Seller's business shall be conducted only in the 
ordinary and usual course and substantially in accordance with its prior business practices, with a 
view to maintaining the goodwill, the Assets, Seller's customer relationships and its business 
reputation. 
(b) Employees. If requested by the Buyer, Seller shall use its best efforts to 
cause the present employees, as selected by Buyer, to accept employment with Buyer after the 
Closing. Buyer shall not, however, have any obligation to offer employment to any employee of 
Seller. 
(c) Employee Compensation. From the date hereof to the Closing Date, Seller 
shall not engage or employ any new employees except in the normal course of business or 
increase the rate of compensation payable, or to become payable, to any present employee, or 
pay any bonus or extraordinary compensation to any such employee, other than normal pay 
increases, bonuses and other compensation practices of Seller in the normal course of business. 
Section 7.2. Access to Information, Etc. 
(a) Access to Information Pending. Pending the Closing, Seller shall provide 
to Buyer (and Buyer's counsel, accountants and other representatives), without charge, full and 
complete access (in such manner so as not to unreasonably interfere with the normal conduct of 
Seller's business) to the books, records and information of Seller concerning the Assets and 
Seller's business which is reasonably necessary for the orderly transfer of the Assets and the 
consummation of the transactions contemplated by this Agreement. 
(b) Approvals. If required, Buyer and Seller will promptly and expeditiously 
make all appropriate filings or applications with third parties (including, without limitation, the 
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application for the New Dealer Agreement), give all notices concerning the transactions 
contemplated by this Agreement, and will cooperate with one another in developing and 
presenting any data or information necessary in connection therewith. 
(c) Prompt Notice of Events. Pending Closing, (1) Seller shall give Buyer 
prompt notice of any material developments affecting the Assets, and (2) Seller and Buyer shall 
give prompt notice to each other of the occurrence of any event which would cause any of the 
representations made by Seller or by Buyer to be untrue in any material respect. 
ARTICLE 8 
CLOSING 
The Closing of the transactions contemplated hereby (the "Closing") shall take place at 
Escrow Offices, or such other location as mutually agreed to by the parties, as provided in the 
Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement, on the first to occur of (1) within a reasonable time as 
agreed to by the parties after the New Dealer Agreement is confirmed in writing to the Buyer by 
the Manufacturer as required herein, or (2) November 15, 2001, or at such other time, date and/or 
place as the parties mutually may designate in writing. Although this Agreement is intended to 
be executed and delivered in advance of the Closing, final closing, consummation and 
completion hereof shall remain conditional upon satisfaction or written waiver of the conditions 
precedent set forth in this Agreement. The Closing may be extended by Buyer, in Buyer's 
discretion, for up to an additional ninety (90) days beyond 15 November 2001 to allow time for 
issuance of the New Dealer Agreement, provided that the Buyer theretofore have used its best, 
diligent, good-faith efforts to timely perform all of Buyer's obligations in connection with such 
issuance but, despite such diligence by Buyer, the New Dealer Agreement remains unissued as of 
15 November 2001. 
ARTICLE 9 
DEFAULT 
If either party fails to perform any of its obligations hereunder and such condition is not 
cured within ten (10) days after written notice thereof by the other, such party shall be in default 
hereunder and the non-defaulting party shall be entitled to proceed at law and in equity to 
enforce its rights under this Agreement. Buyer's rights shall include, without limitation, the right 
to seek specific performance of this Agreement. Seller's rights shall include, without limitation, 
the right to retain the portion of the Earnest Money Deposit as set forth in Paragraph 2.1(b) of 
this Agreement as liquidated damages. The parties recognize and agree that, due to the fluidity of 
the motor vehicle dealership market generally and the unique nature of the Dealership, the full 
extent of Seller's damages in the event of Buyer's breach of its obligation to close this transaction 
is difficult or impossible to measure, and that the Earnest Money Deposit represents the parties' 




ACQUISITION OF NEW VEHICLES AFTER CLOSING 
The Buyer acknowledges that the President of the Seller, Larry J. Coet, shall have the 
unconditional right to purchase from the Buyer by special order from the manufacturer one 
motor vehicle every other year commencing on the date of Closing, said vehicles to be purchased 
at the Buyer's triple net cost of such vehicles plus dealer's preparation charges. Such vehicles 
must be purchased for personal use only and not for resale. The term of the Seller's rights to 
purchase new vehicles from the Buyer shall terminate ten years immediately following the 




Section 11.1. Survival of Representations and Warranties. The respective obligations 
of Buyer and Seller hereunder and all representations and warranties made in this Agreement, all 
exhibits hereto, and all certificates and documents delivered pursuant hereto, shall survive the 
Closing. 
Section 11.2. Binding Agreement. This Agreement shall be binding upon and shall 
inure to the benefit of the successors and assigns of the respective parties hereto. Buyer's 
obligations hereunder shall be the joint and several obligations of all of the parties who comprise 
Buyer from time to time. 
Section 11.3. Captions. The headings used in this Agreement are inserted for reference 
purposes only and shall not be deemed to define, limit, extend, describe, or affect in any way the 
meaning, scope or interpretation of any of the terms or provisions of this Agreement or the intent 
hereof. 
Section 11.4. Counterparts. This Agreement may be signed in any number of 
counterparts with the same effect as if the signatures upon any counterpart were upon the same 
instrument. All signed counterparts shall be deemed to be one original. 
Section 11.5. Severability. The provisions of this Agreement are severable, and should 
any provision hereof be void, voidable, unenforceable or invalid, such void, voidable, 
unenforceable or invalid provision shall not affect the other provisions of this Agreement. 
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Section 11.6. Waiver of Breach. Any waiver by either party of any breach of any kind 
or character whatsoever by the other, whether such be direct or implied, shall not be construed as 
a continuing waiver of, or consent to, any subsequent breach of this Agreement. 
Section 11.7. Cumulative Remedies. The rights and remedies of the parties hereto shall 
be construed cumulatively, and none of such rights and remedies shall be exclusive of, or in lieu 
or limitation of, any other right, remedy or priority allowed by law. 
Section 11.8. Amendment This Agreement may not be modified except by an 
instrument in writing signed by the parties hereto. 
Section 11.9. Interpretation. This Agreement shall be interpreted, construed and 
enforced according to the substantive laws of the state of Utah. Any disputes arising as a result 
of the terms and conditions of this Agreement shall be resolved in a Court situated in the State of 
Utah. 
Section 11.10. Attorneysy Fees. In the event any action or proceeding is taken or brought 
by either party concerning this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its 
costs and reasonable attorneys' fees, whether such sums are expended with or without suit, at 
trial, on appeal or in any bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding. 
Section 11.11. Notice. All notices provided for herein shall be in writing and shall be 
given by first class mail, certified or registered, postage prepaid, addressed to the parties at their 
respective addresses set forth above or at such other address(es) as may be designated by a party 
from time to time in writing. 
Section 11.12. Brokers. Seller represents and warrants to Buyer that no broker or finder 
acted for it or is entitled to any fee or commission in respect of the transactions contemplated 
hereby. Seller shall indemnify and hold Buyer harmless in respect of any breach of the foregoing 
representation and warranty. Similarly, Buyer represents and warrants to Seller that no broker or 
finder acted for Buyer or is entitled to any fee or commission in respect of the transactions 
contemplated hereby. Buyer shall indemnify and hold Seller harmless in respect of any breach of 
the foregoing representation and warranty. 
Section 11.13. Time of Essence. Time is of the essence to this Agreement. 
Section 11.14. Costs. All costs and expenses, including attorneys' fees, incurred by each 




Section 11.15. Assignment. Buyer may freely assign his rights, and delegate his duties, 
under this Agreement, provided that no such assignment shall relieve Buyer of the ultimate 
performance of his obligations hereunder. 
Section 11.16. Interpretation. This Agreement is the result of arm's length negotiations 
between, and the collaborative efforts of, sophisticated businessmen. Consequently, this 
Agreement shall be interpreted in an absolutely neutral fashion, with no regard to the identity of 
the "drafter" of this Agreement. 
DATED effective the date first written above. 
SELLER: 
LARRY J. COET PONTIAC CHEVROLET BUICK, 
INC., a Utah corporation 
By: -~\Jsst< '- //>^ 
,ARR^J. L  COET, PresidenT 
BUYER: 
LABRUM CHEVROLET PONTIAC BUICK, INC., a 
Utah corporation 
DMNY R. LABRUM, President 
323866-2 
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Exhibit "A" to 
Asset Sale Agreement 
FURNITURE, FIXTURES, TOOLS, AND EQUIPMENT 
323866-2 
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Exhibit "B" to 
Asset Sale Agreement 
ASSETS NOT SUBJECT TO THE ASSET SALE AGREEMENT 
323866-2 
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Exhibit "C" to 
Asset Sale Agreement 
EQUIPMENT OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED BY BUYER 
1. Parts Inventory and 
Catalogue Inventory System 
and Equipment Use Agreement dated 
April 24, 2001 
2. ADP Computer Software 
Lease Agreement dated May 26, 1999 
3. B&G use of equipment 
Agreement dated August 9, 1999 
Lessor: Bell & Howell 
1909 Old Mansfield Road 
Wooster, Ohio 
Lessor: ADP Leasing 
99 Jefferson Rd 
Sippany, N.J. 07054-0449 
Kenz & Leslie Distributing Co., Inc. 
PO Box 1066 
Arvada, CO 80001-1066 
4. Crus Oil - use of equipment 
Agreement dated March 15, 2001 
Crus Oil, Inc. 
2260 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84415-2631 
5 . Lucent Technologies Maintenance 
Agreement for telephone system dated 
March 15, 2001 
Lucent Technologies 
169 Mountain Way Drive, #107 
Orem, Utah 84058 
6. ADT Fire & Alarm Service Agreement 
Dated June 14, 1996 
ADT Security Services, Inc. 
836 East 300 South 
7. Aramark - Uniforms 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
PO Box 65525 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84165 
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Gary R. Howe, Attorney 
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH 
10 East South Temple, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Re: Coet Chevrolet v. Labrum Chevrolet et al.; 
Letter of Understanding Concerning Evaluation of Claims 
Dear Gary: 
This letter will set out the terms of our understanding and agreement with respect to an attempt 
to resolve disputes between Larry J. Coet Chevrolet Pontiac Buick, Inc.("Coet") and Labrum Chevrolet 
Pontiac Buick, Inc. ("Labrum"). All terms not otherwise defined in this letter shall have the meaning 
given them in the Asset Sale Agreement between the parties. 
1. Composition of the Evaluation Team. Coet and Labrum shall each choose a certified public 
accountant who, working as the co-equal of the individual selected by the other party (hereinafter the 
"Evaluation Team"), shall conduct an evaluation of the various claims of the respective parties 
("Evaluation"). Coet designates Becky Taylor, and Labrum designates Steven Racker, as Evaluation 
Team members. Ms. Taylor and Mr. Racker signify their acceptance of these appointments by signing 
below. 
2. Scope of Work. The Evaluation shall comprise the following tasks: 
a. Review and Analysis of Used Vehicle Inventory Claims. With reference to the 
Asset Sale Agreement, the Evaluation Team shall determine the total actual cash value of the Used Vehicle 
Inventory as of November 15, 2001. The Evaluation Team shall discuss, review and analyze the parties' 
respective claims with respect to Used Vehicle Inventory, and endeavor to arrive at a consensus as to the 
total value of such claims, whether or not such amounts have been paid as agreed upon by the parties, and 
Gary R. Howe, Attorney 
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whether either of the parties owes the other party any amount with respect to such claims and, if so, the 
amount owed. Among other potential issues, Coet claims that on November 15, 2001, Labrum asserted 
a claim against Coet for the purchase of the Used Vehicle Inventory in the amount of $41,470.00, which 
Coet claims was paid in full on November 15, 2001. Coet claims that the amount owed by Labrum for 
the purchase of the Used Vehicle Inventory is $46,715.00. 
b. Parts. With reference to the Asset Sale Agreement, the Evaluation Team shall 
determine the dollar value of parts in inventory as of November 15, 2001 that were Obsolete Parts (as 
defined in the Asset Sale Agreement), as well as the parts in inventory as of November 15, 2001 that were 
not Obsolete Parts. The Evaluation Team shall not endeavor to determine whether either party owes any 
sum to the other party based on parts obsolescence, but shall limit the Evaluation to a determination of 
the value of Obsolete Parts and non-Obsolete Parts as of November 15, 2001. 
c. Additional Expenses Agreed to at Closing. The Evaluation Team shall discuss, 
review and analyze the parties' respective claims with regard to asphalt paving, balance of the ADP 
contract, computer acquisition, and payment of 50 % of the employee medical plan payment for November 
2001. The Evaluation Team shall endeavor to arrive at a consensus as to the total value of such claims, 
whether or not such amounts have been paid as agreed upon by the parties, and whether either of the 
parties owes the other party any amount with respect to such claims and, if so, the amount owed. 
d. Interest from Delayed Pay Off. The Evaluation Team shall discuss, review and 
analyze the parties' respective positions relating to claims for interest expense due to an alleged delayed 
pay off on the real estate and new and used car flooring lines. The Evaluation Team shall endeavor to 
arrive at a consensus as to the total value of such claims, whether or not such amounts have been paid as 
agreed upon by the parties, and whether either of the parties owes the other party any amount with respect 
to such claims and, if so, the amount owed. 
e. New Vehicle Inventory. With reference to the Asset Sale Agreement, the 
Evaluation Team shall determine the total actual cash value of the New Vehicle Inventory as of November 
15, 2001. The Evaluation Team shall discuss, review and analyze the parties' respective claims with 
respect to Used Vehicle Inventory, and endeavor to arrive at a consensus as to the total value of such 
claims, whether or not such amounts have been paid as agreed upon by the parties, and whether either 
of the parties owes the other party any amount with respect to such claims and, if so, the amount owed. 
Among other potential issues, Coet now claims that Labrum asserted that Coet owed Labrum the sum 
of $27,263.31, which Coet claims was paid to Labrum on November 15, 2001. Coet now claims it is 
owed $32,911.65. 
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f. Other Claims. The Evaluation Team shall discuss, review and analyze the 
following additional claims of the parties and the parties' respective positions with respect to such claims. 
The Evaluation Team shall endeavor to arrive at a consensus as to the total value of all such claims, 
whether or not such amounts have been paid as agreed upon by the parties, and whether either of the 
parties owes the other party any amount with respect to such claims and, if so, the amount owed. Such 
claims are limited to the following: 
i) Labrum claims Coet owes Labrum approximately $31.31 for interest on GMAC 
funding paid to Coet's account. 
ii) Labrum claims Coet owes Labrum approximately $7,618 for warranty claims and 
predelivery inspections. 
iii) Labrum claims Coet owes Labrum approximately $120.06 in fuel credits. 
iv) Labrum claims Coet owes Labrum approximately $3,045.16 in GM floor plan 
interest. 
v) Labrum claims Coet owes Labrum approximately $7,600.92 for GM holdbacks. 
vi) Labrum claims Coet owes Labrum approximately $27.04 for repairs for Joe Rush. 
vii) Labrum claims Coet owes Labrum approximately $497.81 for American Express 
payments 
viii) Labrum claims Coet owes Labrum approximately $232.37 for parts purchased from 
GM 
ix) Coet claims Labrum owes Coet for a 1992 Ford Three Quarter Ton pickup truck, 
VIN 2PTHF26M2NCA2221, which Coet claims was a used vehicle taken in on 
trade prior to the closing and that the underlying lien was paid off by Coet and the 
vehicle sold by Labrum. Coet claims the dollar amount of the trade-in allowance 
is $4,300.00. 
x) Coet claims Labrum owes Coet for gas and oil inventory in existence as of the date 
of closing in the amount of $6,076.00. 
A 
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xi) Coet claims Labrum owes Coet for parts charged to Coet's GM Open Account 
beginning November 15,2001 through December 27,2001 in the amount of $8,573.41. 
xii) Coet claims Labrum owes Coet for other charges on GM Open Account from 
November 28, 2001 through January 17, 2002 in the amount of $3,339.33. 
3. Objective of Evaluation. The Evaluation is intended by Coet and Labrum to be, and shall be 
conducted by the Evaluation Team as, an independent examination, assessment, and application of the 
relevant provisions of the Asset Sale Agreement and related documents, for the purpose of resolving all 
of the respective claims between the parties, with the exception of whether either party is legally 
responsible to the other party for parts obsolescence. 
4. Reference Resources. In conducting the Evaluation, the Evaluation Team shall have access 
to and shall rely on, the Asset Sale Agreement, related documents, and such books and records as Coet 
and Labrum, or either of them, (i) actually utilized to establish the Used Vehicle Inventory actual cash 
value for purposes of the Asset Sale Agreement and (ii) such additional documents, records, and books 
of account that Coet and Labrum may provide to the Evaluation Team. In addition, the Evaluation Team 
may, in its discretion, consult with such persons as members of the Evaluation Team shall deem 
Reasonable in furtherance of arriving at a consensus on the issues set forth above. 
5. Methodology of Evaluation. The Evaluation Team shall carry out its tasks as a two-member 
team, and shall conduct such consultations with Coet or Labrum or their respective representatives as the 
members of the Evaluation Team shall deem reasonable in furtherance of arriving at a consensus on the 
issues set forth above, including, without limitation, joint or separate consultations with either Coet or 
Labrum. The Evaluation Team shall employ such skill, due diligence, methods, practices, procedures, 
and tests as certified public accountants customarily use in an engagement of similar scope and 
complexity. 
6. Terms of Engagement. Coet shall be solely and separately responsible and liable for payment 
of any fees incurred or charged by the accountant designated by him. Labrum shall be solely and 
separately responsible and liable for payment of any fees incurred or charged by the accountant designated 
by him. 
7. Deadline for Results of Evaluation; Impasse. 
a. The Results of the Evaluation ("Results"): 
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(1) shall be presented in writing to Coet and Labrum jointly no later than 
March 15, 2005; 
(2) shall present the Evaluation Team's findings and conclusions with respect to 
each of the issues described above; 
(3) may be accompanied by such explanatory or supporting documentation as the 
Evaluation Team may find helpful; and 
(4) shall be the joint property of Coet and Labrum. 
b. It is anticipated that the Results shall be the unanimous conclusion of the members of 
the Evaluation Team, and the Evaluation Team members are directed to use their best efforts to arrive at 
a unanimous conclusions on all issues described above. To the extent the members of the Evaluation 
Team cannot arrive at a unanimous conclusion with respect to any particular issue, the Evaluation Team 
may submit separate reports (or separate sections within the same report) to report their separate findings 
and conclusions with respect to any such issue. If at any time during the Evaluation it becomes clear to 
the members of the Evaluation Team that they cannot reach a unanimous decision on any issue, the 
Evaluation Team or either of its members shall immediately advise Coet and Labrum of the impasse. A 
unanimous conclusion by the accountants that they cannot reach a conclusion on any particular accounting 
item because one of the parties has not supported its claim after requests by the accountants that it do so 
shall result in that particular claim being waived. 
8. Release and Waiver. In consideration of the employment by the Evaluation Team of such skill, 
due diligence, methods, practices, procedures, and tests as certified public accountants would customarily 
use in an engagement of similar scope and complexity, Coet and Labrum, each on behalf of itself, and 
all its officers, directors, employees, agents, insurers, affiliates, successors and assigns, waives and 
releases the Evaluation Team and each member of the Evaluation Team and their respective employers 
from any and all claims, complaints, losses, demands, damages, actions, causes of action, or suits of 
whatever kind or nature with respect to or arising out of the dispute between the parties and the issues 
described above. 
9. Binding Effect; Admissibility of Evaluation Results; Release of Claims. Coet and Labrum agree 
that the unanimous findings and conclusions of the Evaluation Team shall be binding on the parties, and 
each party accepts and agrees to abide by the unanimous findings and conclusions of the Evaluation Team. 
The report(s) and results of the Evaluation Team shall be admissible in any legal proceeding between the 
parties to prove or disprove any fact in issue. Each party agrees to pay to the other party any sum(s) the 
Evaluation Team unanimously determines is owed by such party to the other party. Upon payment by 
..f) 
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fLabrum of any such sum (if any), Coet, for and on behalf of himself, itself and its owners, principals, 
affiliates, officers, directors, agents, employees, affiliates, successors and assigns, releases and forever 
discharges Labrum and its owners, principals, affiliates, officers, directors, agents, employees, affiliates, 
successors and assigns, from any and all claims, demands, suits, causes of action or obligations of 
whatever nature, known or unknown, contingent or non-contingent, that anyone claiming through or under 
Coet may have or believe to have against Labrum, including without limitation all claims that relate in 
any way to the lawsuit with Civil Number 030500537, currently pending in the Fourth Judicial District 
Court of Wasatch County, State of Utah (the "Lawsuit"), and any claims asserted or that could have been 
asserted in that lawsuit, excepting from this release only such claims as to which there is not a unanimous 
decision by the Evaluation Team. Upon payment by Coet of any such sum (if any), Labrum, for and on 
behalf of himself, itself and its owners, principals, affiliates, officers, directors, agents, employees, 
affiliates, successors and assigns, releases and forever discharges Coet and its owners, principals, 
affiliates, officers, directors, agents, employees, affiliates, successors and assigns, from any and all 
claims, demands, suits, causes of action or obligations of whatever nature, known or unknown, contingent 
or non-contingent, that anyone claiming through or under Labrum may have or believe to have against 
Coet, including without limitation all claims that relate in any way to the lawsuit with Civil Number 
030500537, currently pending in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Wasatch County, State of Utah, and 
any claims asserted or that could have been asserted in that lawsuit, excepting from this release only such 
claims as to which there is not a unanimous decision by the Evaluation Team and claims relating to parts 
obsolescence. With respect to parts obsolescence, any unanimous finding or conclusion by the Evaluation 
Team with respect to the value of parts that are or are not Obsolete Parts shall be binding on both Coet 
and Labrum. 
10. Preclusive Effect on Additional Claims. The parties acknowledge and agree that the claims 
itaised in this letter agreement constitute all of the accounting-type claims for damages related to the Asset 
Sale Agreement and closing. The parties shall be precluded from raising or asserting (in the Lawsuit or 
otherwise) any claims for damages related to the Asset Sale Agreement and the Closing, except for: (i) 
any accounting issues that are not resolved by the Evaluation Team and (ii) any legal issues that must be 
resolved in order to achieve a complete resolution of the accounting issues specifically addressed in this 
Agreement. 
If this letter accurately states the terms of our understanding and agreement with respect to the 
engagement of accountants to attempt to resolve the disputes and issues described above, please indicate, 
on behalf of your clients, your acceptance and approval below on the enclosed duplicate of this letter and 
\ 
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return a fully-executed copy. Please note that we are prepared to immediately nominate Labrum's 
member of the Evaluation Team and to provide the evaluation resources identified in Section 4 above. 
Accordingly, we request that your clients give this matter their immediate attention. 
Sincerely yours, 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU I , I S 
Keith A. Call 
ACCEPTED AND AGREED AS WRITTEN ACCEPTED AND AG 
GJftHr, R.<t% \ts-
Gary R. hK)we 
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGI 
Counsel for Larry J. Coet Chevrolet Pontiac 
Buick, Inc. 
WRITTEN 
Steven M. Racker 
WISAN SMITH RACKER & PRESCOTT 
Certified Public Accountant appointed by 
Labrum Chevrolet Pontiac Buick, Inc. 
ACCEPTED AND AGREED AS WRITTEN 
Rl^gr,. &-' TfTJ J^ 
Becky Taytor 
BECKY TAYLOR & ASSOCIATES, CPA 
Certified Public Accountant appointed by 
I^ arry J. Coet Chevrolet Pontiac Buick, Inc. 
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ADDENDUM "C" 
(R-72) 
Minute Telephonic Scheduling Conference, 
January 20, 2005 
4TH DISTRICT COURT - HEBER COURT 
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LARRY J COET CHEVROLET PONTIA, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DANNY R LABRUM Et al, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
TELEPHONIC SCHEDULING CONF, 
Case No: 030500537 CN 
Judge: DEREK P PULLAN 





GARY R HOWE 
KEITH A CALL 
HEARING 
This is the time set for a telephonic scheduling conference. 
Mr. Howe addressed the Court and indicated that he would prepare a 
proposed scheduling conference and submit it to counsel for 
approval and then forward to the Court for signature and filing. 
Response by Mr. Call, moving to dismiss the Complaint and 
indicating that there is not a necessity for a scheduling order. 
Mr. Call indicated that the parties have stipulated to having two 
accountants go over the accounting. 
Mr. Call would move to allowing the accountants to proceed with 
all issues both the disputed amount and the counterclaim issues. 
Response by Mr. Howe, indicating that most the issues are minor. 
Response by Mr. Call. 
Argued by Mr. Howe. Argued by Mr. Call. 
Court will order that Mr. Howe prepare a proposed Scheduling Order 
and submit it to the Court by February 1, 2005. 
Court will further require that before discovery begins that each 
partys' accountant go over all the disputed amounts and see if the 
parties can reach a resolution. 
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ADDENDUM "D" 
(R-81-86) 
Stipulated Case Management Order 
February 18, 2005 
JOHN E.GATES (1169) , \ 4 
KEITH A. CALL (6708) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Facsimile: (801) 363-0900 
Attorneys for Defendants Danny R. Labrum and Labrum Chevrolet Pontiac Buick, Inc. 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASATCH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 




DANNY R. LABRUM, individually, and 
LABRUM CHEVROLET PONTIAC 
BUICK, INC. and RONALD L. COVEY, 




Civil No.: 030500537 
Judge: Derek P. Pullan 
A scheduling conference was conducted telephonically by the Honorable Derek P. Pullan, 
District Court Judge on January 20,2005. Gary R. Howe represented the Plaintiff and Keith A. Call 
represented Defendants Danny R. Labrum and Labrum Chevrolet Pontiac Buick, Inc. 
The Court requested counsel to prepare a Proposed Case Managemert Order that 
incorporates, at a minimum, the following concepts: 
(1) The Court enunciated its desire to have each of the parties select an accountant/CPA 
with expectation that those issues regarding funds claimed by the parties that could 
be resolved by the accountant by mutual affirmation will likely help the parties 
achieve an efficient and just resolution of this matter; and 
(2) That counsel submit to the Court a Stipulated Case Management Order including the 
concepts set forth in paragraph (1) above and setting forth a reasonable time to 
complete pretrial activities in this case after the accountants have completed their 
work. 
Based upon the directive of the Court, the parties stipulate and agree as follows: 
1. Submission of Accounting Disputes to Accounting Evaluation Team. The parties 
shall submit all of the accounting disputes, including all accounting issues raised as part of the claims 
or counterclaims in this lawsuit, to an accounting evaluation team, consistent with the terms of the 
parties' letter agreement, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit A. 
2. Pretrial Deadlines If All Accounting Issues Are Resolved by Accountants' 
Evaluation. If the accounting evaluation team is successfully able to resolve all accounting issues 
between the parties, leaving only legal issues (and accompanying factual background) for resolution 
by the Court, then the following deadlines shall apply: 
a. The parties shall exchange disclosure statements pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 
26(a) by April 1,2005. 
b. The deadline for amending pleadings and/or to join parties shall be May 2, 
2005. 
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c. All fact discovery shall be completed by July 1, 2005. The parties shall be 
limited to 25 written interrogatories, including subparts. All written discovery shall be 
served so as to conform with this deadline. The parties shall be limited to five depositions 
for each side. The discovery methods allowed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure may be 
used, subject to the limitations expressed in those rules. 
d. The parties do not anticipate the need for expert witnesses at this time. If 
either party desires to engage an expert witness, the parties shall attempt in good faith to 
establish deadlines for written expert reports. If the parties cannot agree, they may bring the 
issue to the Court for resolution. 
e. Any dispositive motions shall be filed with the Court on or before July 22, 
2005. 
f. The parties may file a Rule 16(b) request for a scheduling and management 
conference with the Court immediately upon the close of fact discovery or at such earlier 
time as appropriate to establish the date for trial. The estimated length of trial under this 
scenario is currently two days, but this estimate may change after the accountants' evaluation 
is complete. A jury has been demanded. 
3. Pretrial Deadlines If One or More Accounting Issues Are Not Resolved bv 
Accountants' Evaluation. If the accounting evaluation team is not successfully able to resolve all 
accounting issues between the parties, leaving accounting issues as well as legal issues (and 
accompanying factual background) for resolution by the Court, then the following deadlines shall 
apply: 
-3-
a. The parties shall exchange disclosure statements pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 
26(a) by April 1,2005. 
b. The deadline for amending pleadings and/or to join parties shall be May 2, 
2005. 
c. All fact discovery shall be completed by September 15, 2005. The parties 
shall be limited to 50 written interrogatories, including subparts. All written discovery shall 
be served so as to conform with this deadline. The parties shall be limited to ten depositions 
for each side. The discovery methods allowed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure may be 
used, subject to the limitations expressed in those rules. 
d. The parties shall provide the written reports of any experts anticipated to be 
used in their case in chief by no later than October 17,2005. The parties may submit rebuttal 
expert reports by no later than November 30, 2005. Rebuttal expert reports shall be limited 
to rebutting information contained in the other parties' expert reports submitted for their 
respective cases in chief. 
e. Any dispositive motions shall be filed with the Court on or before December 
16,2005. 
f. The parties may file a Rule 16(b) request for a scheduling and management 
conference with the Court immediately upon the close of fact discovery or at such earlier 
time as appropriate to establish the date for trial. The estimated length of trial under this 
scenario is currently three days, but this estimate may change after the accountants' 
evaluation is complete. A jury has been demanded. 
-4-
Dated this /V* day of February, 2005. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH 
/MAAR ^ #A,—= 
Johr/E. Gates Gary R. t4owe 
Keith A. Call Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Attorneys for Defendants Danny R. Labrum 
and Labrum Chevrolet Pontiac Buick, Inc. 
-5-
CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER 
The Court having reviewed the foregoing Stipulated Case Management Order, hereby adopts 
the deadlines and limitations agreed upon by counsel and orders that they be followed for the 
management of this action. 
Dated this /^ day of February, 2005. 
FOtJJRT/H JJpICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
]Perek \mian , District Court Judge 




Letter of Understanding Concerning 
Evaluation of Claims. 
Keith A. Call, Attorney 
Snow Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Gary R. Howe, Attorney 
Callister Nebeker & McCullough 
10 East South Temple, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Re: Coet Chevrolet v Labrum Chevrolet et al: 
Letter of understanding concerning evaluation of claims 
Dear Keith and Gary: 
Pursuant to the letter of understanding concerning evaluation of claims dated February 9, 
2005, Steven M. Racker, CPA and Becky B. Taylor CPA ("Evaluation Team") have 
conducted an evaluation of various claims by Larry J. Coet Chevrolet Pontiac Buick, Inc. 
("Coet") and Labrum Chevrolet Pontiac Buick, Inc. ("Labrum"). The results of our 
evaluation are as follows: 
A. Review and analysis of Used Vehicle Inventory Claims 
The Evaluation Team has reviewed and analyzed the Parties' respective 
claims with respect to Used Vehicle Inventory. 
The Evaluation Team concludes that Labrum owes Coet $46,175.00. 
B. Parts 
The Evaluation Team was unable to determine the dollar value of parts in 
inventory as of November 15, 2001 that were Obsolete Parts (as defined 
by the sales agreement) nor were they able to determine amounts at 
November 15, 2001 that were not Obsolete Parts. 
C. Additional Expenses Agreed to at Closing 
The Evaluation Team reviewed and analyzed the additional expenses 
agreed to at closing as shown on the closing statement dated November 
15, 2001 and have concluded all amounts were agreed to by the parties 
and amounts were properly allocated on the closing statement and that no 
amounts are due either party for such expenses. 
L0425 
D. Interest from Delayed Pay Off 
The Evaluation Team reviewed and analyzed the claims for interest for an 
alleged delayed pay off on real estate and new and used car flooring lines. 
The Evaluation Team concludes that Labium owes Coet $1,035.98. 
E. New Vehicle Inventory 
The Evaluation Team reviewed and analyzed the parties' respective claims 
with respect to new vehicle inventory. 
The Evaluation Team came to a consensus that Labrum owes Coet 
$16,911.65. However there is $9,000.00 still in dispute. 
Labrum asserts that he made a payment on December 7, 2001 to Wells 
Fargo on a new vehicle amounting to $9,000.00 and that such amount 
should be credited against the new vehicle inventory. 
Coet believes that the $9,000.00 payment was against a used vehicle and 
therefore should not affect the purchase price. 
The Evaluation Team was not able to come to an agreement on whether 
the $9,000.00 payment was for a new vehicle or a used vehicle. 
F. Other Claims 
The Evaluation Team reviewed and analyzed additional claims and 
concluded the following: 
i. No amounts are owed either party for this claim. 
ii. Coet owes Labrum $7,211.16 for warranty claims and predelivery 
inspections that were credited to Coet's account. 
iii. No amounts are owed either party of this claim. 
iv. Coet owes Labrum $2,897.24 in GM floor plan interest. 
v. Coet owes Labrum $3,702.99 for GM holdbacks. 
vi. No amounts are owed either party for this claim. 
vii. Coet owes Labrum $515.00 for American Express payments. 
viii. No amounts are owed either party for this claim. 
L0426 / 
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ix. The Evaluation Team could not agree on a wholesale value for the 
1992 Ford Three Quarter Ton pick up truck. 
x. The Evaluation Team could not determine the existence of or 
dollar value of gas and oil inventory at the date of closing. 
xi. Labrum owes Coet $7,784.96 for parts charged to Coet's GM open 
account beginning November 15, 2001 through December 27, 
,2001. 
xii. Labrum owes Coet $1,803.59 for other charges on Coet's GM 
open account from November 28, 2001 to January 17, 2002 
Very Truly Yours, 
ML 
Steven M. Racker 
Wisan, Smith, Racker & Prescott, LLP 
Certified Public Accountant 
Appointed by Labrum Chevrolet Pontiac 
Buick, Inc. 
Ud 2A^ Xa JJLL 
Becky B JTaylor j 
Becky Taylor & Associates 
Certified Public Accountant 
Appointed by Larry J. Coet Chevrolet 
Pontiac Buick, Inc. 
L0427 
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ADDENDUM "F" 
(R-351) 
Verification document; Plaintiffs Exhibit 3 
Danny Labrum and Larry J. Coet agree that parts inventory total $68,000.00 
^/^gpj 
The agreed upon Used Vehicle Inventory dollar amount is $290,275.00 
Danny Labrum 
e agreed upon New Vehicle Inventory dollar amount is $914,450.97 
Danny Labrum 
Dainty Labrum agrees to pay one half of November's (2001) employees hos-
pitalization premium of $4,989.00 which is $2,494.00. 
Danny Labrum 
Larry J. Coet agrees to pay $700.00 per new 2000 vehicles now in inventory if 




Used Vehicle Invenotry List 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 10 
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Asset Sale Agreement - Closing Statement 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 2 
ASSET SALE AGREEMENT - CLOSING STATEMENT 
Purchase Price for the Assets (1.2) $350,000.00 
Adjustments 
a. Value of New Vehicle Inventory as of the 
Closing Date 11-14-01-$914,450.97 less payoff of 
New Vehicle Flooring Line as of Closing Date to 
Wells Fargo Bank - $920,442.32; Net Reduction 
in Purchase Price ($5,991.35) 
^arts - the parties agree that as of the Closing the 
conditions set forth in § 1.2(b) did not require any 
adjustment to the Purchase Price. 
Value of Used Vehicle Inventory as of the 
Closing Date 11-14-01- $290,275.00; less payoff of 
Used Vehicle Flooring Line as of Closing Date to 
Wells Fargo Bank - $290,770.00; Net Reduction 
in Purchase Price ($ 495.00) 
As of the Closing all of the FF&E listed on 
Exhibit "A" attached to the Asset Sale 
Agreement were present at the dealership, 
hence not adjustment was required as per §1.2(d) 
SUBTOTAL ($6,486.35) 
Expenses incurred by the Seller pursuant to the request 
of the Buyer which subsequent to th execution of the 
Asset Sale Agreement, which expense the Buyer 
agrees to reimburse to the Seller at Closing. 
Granite Construction Co. - asphalt paving $ 819.00 
Alliance System Computer deposit ADP, Inc. 
balance of the contract to be paid by Buyer 3,312.00 
EBC Computers - Orem - acquisition 
oftheProSonicEP268 942.00 
SUBTOTAL $ 5,073-00 
\M PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT 
3. Fifty percent (50%) of the Employee Hospital and Medical 
plan payment for the month of November, 2001 
(50% of $4,989.00) 
SUBTOTAL 
TOTAL DUE AT TIME OF CLOSING 
$ 2,494.00 
$351.082.00 







Order Granting Labrum's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment, September 2,2005 
JOHNE. GATES (1169) 
KEITH A. CALL (6708) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Facsimile: (801) 363-0900 
Attorneys for Defendants Danny R. Labrum 
and Labrum Chevrolet Pontiac Buick, Inc. 
FN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASATCH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 




DANNY R. LABRUM, individually, and 
LABRUM CHEVROLET PONTIAC 
BUICK, INC. and RONALD L. COVEY, 
individually and as Personal Guarantor 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING LABRUM'S 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No.: 030500537 
Judge: Derek P. Pullan 
Defendants, Danny R. Labrum individually ("Mr. Labrum") and Labrum Chevrolet Pontiac 
Buick, Inc.'s ("Labrum Chevrolet") moved the court for partial summary judgment on June 6,2005. 
Mr. Labrum and Labrum Chevrolet sought dismissal of Plaintiff, Larry J. Coet Chevrolet, Pontiac. 
r & 
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Buick, Inc.'s ("Plaintiff) claims for attorneys' fees and pre-judgment interest. Plaintiff filed its 
memorandum in opposition on or about June 29, 2005. Mr. Labrum and Labrum Chevrolet filed 
their reply memorandum on or about July 11, 2005. 
The Court held a hearing on the matter on July 29,2005. Mr. Labrum and Labrum Chevrolet 
were represented by Keith A. Call. Plaintiff was represented by Gary R. Howe. The Court heard 
argument from both parties. 
Mr. Labrum and Labrum Chevrolet contend that the parties entered into a letter agreement 
dated February 9, 2005 ("Letter Agreement"), by which the parties agreed upon a procedure for 
addressing, and hopefully resolving, the parties respective claims. Mr. Labrum and Labrum 
Chevrolet contend that a release provision in the Letter Agreement is broad enough to include a 
release of Plaintiff s claims for attorneys' fees and pre-judgment interest. Mr. Labrum and Labrum 
Chevrolet contend that the only "legal issues" excepted from the release provision in the Letter 
Agreement related to the obsolescence of parts. Mr. Labrum and Labrum Chevrolet further contend 
that the Letter Agreement is clear and unambiguous in this regard. 
In opposition to the motion, Plaintiff argues that the purpose of the Letter Agreement was 
to place before the evaluation team solely accounting issues, and that legal issues such as the issue 
of entitlement to attorneys' fees and pre-judgment and the amount of such fees and interest were 
reserved from Letter Agreement. Plaintiff contends the Letter Agreement was limited by a 
Stipulated Case Management Order, signed and entered by the Court on or about February 18,2005, 
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after the execution of the Letter Agreement, which Plaintiff contends requires only "accounting 
issues'* to be submitted to an evaluation team. 
Having reviewed the parties' memoranda and having heard the argument of counsel, the 
Court enters the following findings and conclusions. 
The Court FINDS that there is no genuine dispute as to the following material facts: 
1. Plaintiff and Labrum Chevrolet entered into an Asset Sale Agreement in August 2001, 
providing for the sale of certain assets relating to the Chevrolet dealership in Heber City, Utah from 
Plaintiff to Labrum Chevrolet. 
2. After the sale closed, several disputes arose between the parties giving rise to the 
underlying claims in this action. 
3. Plaintiff filed its Complaint in this lawsuit on November 13, 2003. 
4. The Court conducted a telephonic scheduling conference on January 20, 2005. 
During the scheduling conference, the parties discussed the advantages of involving an accounting 
team to evaluate the accounting issues in this case. 
5. Subsequent to the telephonic scheduling conference with the Court, the parties 
entered into the Letter Agreement, which is dated February 9, 2005. 
6. The parties stated the objective of the accountants' evaluation in Section 3 of the 
Letter Agreement as follows: 
3. Objective of Evaluation. The Evaluation is intended by Coet and 
Labrum to be, and shall be conducted by the Evaluation Team as, an 
independent examination, assessment and application of the relevant 
provisions of the Asset Sale Agreement and related documents, for 
-3-
the purpose of resolving all of the respective claims between the 
parties, with the exception of whether either party is legally 
responsible to the other party for parts obsolescence. 
The Letter Agreement also contained a broad release provision as follows: 
9. Binding Effect; Admissibility of Evaluation Results; Release of 
Claims. Coet and Labrum agree that the unanimous findings and 
conclusions of the Evaluation Team shall be binding on the parties, 
and each party accepts and agrees to abide by the unanimous findings 
and conclusions of the Evaluation Team. The report(s) and results of 
the Evaluation Team shall be admissible in any legal proceeding 
between the parties to prove or disprove any fact in issue. Each party 
agrees to pay to the other party any sum(s) the Evaluation Team 
unanimously determines is owed by such party to the other party. 
Upon payment by Labrum of any such sum (if any), Coet, for and on 
behalf of himself, itself and its owners, principals, affiliates, officers, 
directors, agents, employees, affiliates, successors and assigns, 
releases and forever discharges Labrum and its owners, principals, 
affiliates, officers, directors, agents, employees, affiliates, successors 
and assigns, from any and all claims, demands, suits, causes of action 
or obligations of whatever nature, known or unknown, contingent or 
non-contingent, that anyone claiming through or under Coet may have 
or believe to have against Labrum, including without limitation all 
claims that relate in any way to the lawsuit with Civil Number 
030500537, currently pending in the Fourth Judicial District Court of 
Wasatch County, State of Utah (the "Lawsuit"), and any claims 
asserted or that could have been asserted in that lawsuit, excepting 
from this release only such claims as to which there is not a 
unanimous decision by the Evaluation Team. Upon payment by Coet 
of any such sum (if any), Labrum, for and on behalf of himself, itself 
and its owners, principals, affiliates, officers, directors, agents, 
employees, affiliates, successors and assigns, releases and forever 
discharges Coet and its owners, principals, affiliates, officers, 
directors, agents, employees, affiliates, successors and assigns, from 
any and all claims, demands, suits, causes of action or obligations of 
whatever nature, known or unknown, contingent or non-contingent, 
that anyone claiming through or under Labrum may have or believe 
to have against Coet, including without limitation all claims that 
relate in any way to the lawsuit with Civil Number 030500537, 
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currently pending in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Wasatch 
County, State of Utah, and any claims asserted or that could have 
been asserted in that lawsuit, excepting from this release only such 
claims as to which there is not a unanimous decision by the 
Evaluation Team and claims relating to parts obsolescence. With 
respect to parts obsolescence, any unanimous finding or conclusion 
by the Evaluation Team with respect to the value of parts that are or 
are not Obsolete Parts shall be binding on both Coet and Labrum. 
8. The Letter Agreement also contained the following provision: 
10. Preclusive Effect on Additional Claims. The parties acknowledge 
and agree that the claims raised in this letter agreement constitute all 
of the accounting-type claims for damages related to the Asset Sale 
Agreement and closing. The parties shall be precluded from raising 
or asserting (in the Lawsuit or otherwise) any claims for damages 
related to the Asset Sale Agreement and the Closing, except for: (i) 
any accounting issues that are not resolved by the Evaluation Team 
and (ii) any legal issues that must be resolved in order to achieve a 
complete resolution of the accounting issues specifically addressed in 
this Agreement. 
9. The Court signed and entered a Stipulated Case Management Order ("CMO") on or 
about February 18, 2005. The CMO, which is part of the record in this case, provides, among other 
things, "The parties shall submit all of the accounting disputes, including all accounting issues raised 
as part of the claims or counterclaims in this lawsuit, to an accounting evaluation team, consistent 
with the terms of the parties' letter agreement, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit A." Exhibit 
A to the CMO was the parties' signed Letter Agreement. The CMO further provided, "If the 
accounting evaluation team is successfully able to resolve all accounting issues between the parties, 
leaving only legal issues (and accompanying factual background) for resolution by the Court, then 
the following deadlines shall apply: . . ." The CMO also provided, "If the accounting evaluation 
team is not successfully able to resolve all accounting issues between the parties, leaving accounting 
issues as well as legal issues (and accompanying factual background) for resolution by the Court, 
then the following deadlines shall apply: . . . " 
10. The evaluation team chosen by the parties conducted an evaluation and issued their 
letter decision on or about April 28,2005. The evaluation team determined that each of the parties 
owed the other party certain sums on certain claims. The net result, as determined by the evaluation 
team, was that Labrum Chevrolet owed Plaintiff $59,384.79. 
11. After the evaluation team issued its letter decision, Labrum Chevrolet issued a check 
payable to Plaintiff in the amount of $59,384.79 and delivered the check to counsel for Plaintiff. 
12. Plaintiff rejected Labrum Chevrolet's check because Plaintiff disagreed with Mr. 
Labrum's and Labrum Chevrolet's position that delivery of the check effectuated a complete release 
of all of Plaintiffs claims (including claims for attorneys' fees and interest). Plaintiff claimed 
Labrum Chevrolet also owed Plaintiff for attorneys' fees and interest notwithstanding the Letter 
Agreement and delivery of the check by Labrum Chevrolet. 
13. Subsequently, the parties agreed that Plaintiff could cash the check without further 
prejudice to its ability to claim attorneys' fees and interest, in exchange for an agreement that 
interest, if any were owed, would cease to accrue as of the date the check cleared the bank. 
14. After this agreement was reached, Plaintiff cashed the check. 
The Court reaches the following CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
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A. The underlying purpose in construing or interpreting a contract is to ascertain the 
intentions of the parties to the contract. See e.g., Nov ell Inc. v. The Canopy Group, Inc., 2004 Utah 
App. 162^20, 92 P.3d 768. 
B. If the language within the four corners of the contract is unambiguous, the parties' 
intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language, and the contract may 
be interpreted as a matter of law. Id. 
C. An ambiguity exists in a contract term or provision if it is capable of more than one 
reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial 
deficiencies. Id. 
D. The Letter Agreement in this case is clear and unambiguous. 
E. The CMO did not limit the scope of the "purpose" or "release" language in the Letter 
Agreement. While the CMO did repeatedly reference the submission of "accounting issues" to the 
evaluation team, it specifically provided that the evaluation would be conducted "consistent with the 
terms of the parties letter agreement," which was referenced and attached as an exhibit to the CMO. 
F. Section 3 of the Letter Agreement unambiguously states the purpose and objective 
of the Letter Agreement, which was to resolve all of the respective claims between the parties, with 
the exception of those related to legal responsibility of the parties for parts obsolescence. 
G. Even if the parties submitted to the evaluation team solely issues related to 
accounting, Section 9 of the Letter Agreement provides that upon payment by Labrum Chevrolet of 
Labrum Chevrolet from any and all claims of whatever nature, known or unknown, contingent or 
non-contingent, including without limitation all claims relating in any way to the lawsuit. 
H. Plaintiffs' claims for attorneys' fees and interest were released and waived under 
Section 9 of the Letter Agreement upon payment by Labrum Chevrolet of the sums determined by 
the accountants to be owed to Plaintiff. 
I. Based on the clear and unambiguous language of the Letter Agreement, Labrum and 
Labrum Chevrolet are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claims for attorneys' fees and pre-
judgment interest. 
J. In addition, the broad release of contractual obligations includes a release of any 
obligation to pay attorneys' fees and interest unless the attorneys' fees and interest are expressly 
carved out of the release. Krumme v. Westpoint Stevens, Inc., 238 F.2d 133 (2nd Cir. 2000); Estate 
ofGivens, 938 S.W. 2d 679,681-82 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); Adams v. American Int I Group, Inc., 791 
N.E.2d 26, 32 (111. Ct. App. 2003). 
K. In addition, the express mention of certain exceptions in the release at issue in this 
case, by implication excludes all other possible exceptions. Thus, the failure to except attorneys' 
fees and pre-judgment interest from the broad release provisions of Section 9 of the Letter 
Agreement results in a release and waiver of such claims. 
/ / / 
/ / / 
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Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
Labrum's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is granted. Plaintiffs' claims for attorneys' fees 
and pre-judgment interest are dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this _ ^ day of A^gQsC2005. 
BY TJ^E C^URT: 
onoraire Derek P. Pullan 
iDistriclj Court Judge iDistpctjU 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
,l^LA.d(UL 
John E. Gates 
Keith A. Call 
Attorneys for Defendants Danny R. Labrum 
and Labrum Chevrolet Pontiac Buick, Inc 
CALLISTER NEBEKER & MCCULLOUGH 
H^fr^. r\. -Hdc*-
Gary R. Hflwe 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I state that I am employed in the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys 
for Plaintiff herein; that she served the attached ORDER GRANTING LABRUM'S MOTION 
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, Case No. 030500537, Fourth Judicial District Court, 
Salt Lake County, upon the following parties by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an 
envelope to: 
Gary R. Howe 
Callister Nebeker & McCullough 
Gateway Tower East, Suite 900 
10 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
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1 The record should reflect that the parties are both present 
2 together with their respective Counsel. 
3 Initially let me extend my appreciation and gratitude to 
4 Counsel for your careful preparation for today's trial. To the 
5 clients, you've been represented today by skilled advocates. 
6 Their many hours m the practice of law, years have been spent, 
7 hours of study, careful thought and writing have all been brought 
8 to bear for your benefit today at trial. They have conducted 
9 themselves as models of professionalism and civility, and I 
10 extend to them my gratitude for that. 
11 The Court has carefully listened to almost a full day of 
12 testimony today. Based on the testimony and exhibits that have 
13 been presented to me, I now enter the following findings of fact. 
14 Plaintiff Larry J. Coet Chevrolet has owned and operated the 
15 Chevrolet dealership m Heber City since 1986. In August 2001 
16 Coet entered into an asset sale agreement for the sale of the 
17 dealership to the defendant, Danny Labrum Chevrolet. 
18 In the agreement Labrum agreed to purchase the used 
19 vehicle inventory, which includes all used motor vehicles which 
20 are in the seller's inventory at the time of closing, which 
21 vehicles have been previously titled. Labrum also agreed to 
22 purchase the Coet's parts and accessories inventory established 
23 by physical count as of the closing, excluding any and all 
24 obsolete parts. 
25 The agreement defined obsolete parts to mean any part 
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1 not included in the manufacturer's current parts pricing list, 
2 any part on which the seal has been opened or is materially 
3 damaged, any part which is missing portions of its working 
4 mechanisms so that it would not be accepted for return, and parts 
5 in excess of a 180-day supply. 
6 Under the agreement if after conducting the physical 
7 inventory the value of then existing parts was less than $68,000 
8 the sale price for the dealership would be adjusted by the 
9 difference between $68,000 and the actual value of the parts. If 
10 the value of the parts exceeded $68,000 there would be no 
11 adjustment. 
12 The parts were to be valued at the listed price in the 
13 current price book for parts. Obsolete parts were not — were to 
14 be excluded from the inventory. After the sale Labrum would have 
15 a one time opportunity to return parts to GM. 
16 In the agreement Labrum also agreed to purchase Coet's 
17 gas, oil, grease as an inventory item at current values based on 
18 a physical inventory which shall be taken immediately prior to 
19 closing. Finally, under several provisions in the agreement, 
20 Coet had a duty to deliver title to the used vehicle inventory 
21 free and clear of all liens or encumbrances. 
22 Prior to the closing date Labrum had access to three 
23 years of Coet's financial statements and Coet's operating reports 
24 for three months in 2001. Ms. Mullaly testified that she was 
25 hired by Coet on August 31st, 2002, and at that time Coet's 
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1 records, in her words, were a mess. Her initial focus was to 
2 reconcile accounts receivable, a task which she testified proved 
3 difficult. 
4 On November 8th, 2001, less than one week before the 
5 closing, Gary Robinson purchased a new truck from Coet. At the 
6 time of the purchase Robinson owned a 1991 Chevy pickup. 
7 Robinson was going to trade in the 1991 pickup in connection with 
8 the sale, but he had a friend, Johnny Jessen, who wanted the 
9 truck. At that time Jessen owned a 1992 Ford pickup. He and 
10 Robinson agreed to exchange trucks. Robinson traded in the 1992 
11 Ford pickup to Coet as part of his new vehicle purchase. Coet 
12 agreed to pay off the $2300 balance owing to Federal Credit Union 
13 on the 1991 Chevy. Jessen would get the 1991 Chevy at the time 
14 he delivered his 1992 Ford pickup to Coet. 
15 The sale as described was completed on November 8th, 
16 2001. On November 10th or 12th, 2001 the Ford pickup was listed 
17 in Coet's used vehicle inventory. Its value was listed at $1900. 
18 On November 13th, 2001 at 6 a.m. Jessen delivered the 1992 Ford 
19 pickup to the dealership. He left the keys in the truck and 
20 deposited the signed title in Coet's drop box. He then drove 
21 away in his new -- in Robinson's old -- 1991 Chevy pickup. 
22 On the evening of November 13th, 2001 Labrum and an 
23 associate conducted an inspection of the used vehicles on the lot 
24 at the dealership. After the inspection Labrum and Coet 
25 negotiated a $290,275 sale price for the used car inventory. 
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1 On November 12th, 2001 Larry Coet, Danny Labrum, Rachel 
2 Labrum and a man named Lyle, who I think is a brother-in-law? 
3 MR. CALL: Danny's brother, Lyle Labrum. 
4 THE COURT: Okay, Lyle Labrum met at the dealership to 
5 conduct a parts inventory. Mr. Coet and Mr. Labrum took turns 
6 identifying each part number and then counting the number of that 
7 particular part in the inventory. Rachel Labrum and Lyle Labrum 
8 recorded these numbers. 
9 During this inventory Mr. Labrum could have identified 
10 any part the seal of which had been opened -- the seal of which 
11 had been opened. Mr. Labrum could have also identified any 
12 part which was not included in the current parts pricing list. 
13 Mr. Labrum was in the best position to know which parts were 
14 materially defective or damaged such that GM would not accept 
15 them or which were in excess of a 180-day supply. 
16 Late in the evening after four to five hours of this 
17 parts inventory, Labrum agreed that continuing the inventory 
18 would not be necessary because he was satisfied that more 
19 than $68,000 in parts existed. When asked Mr. Coet stated to 
20 Mr. Labrum, "I don't have an obsolete parts problem." Based on 
21 that statement the parties -- and the inventory, the parties 
22 agreed that no adjustment would be necessary for parts under the 
23 asset sales agreement. 
24 Coet's records show that as of October 31sC, 2001 Coet 
25 had approximately $79,000 in parts, and that obsolete parts in 
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1 stock for more than 12 months were valued at more than $25,000. 
2 After the closing Labrum determined that $3,228.36 existed in 
3 non-GM parts, approximately $3800 m non-refundable GM parts, 
4 $560 in multi-parts which were missing certain parts or 
5 mechanism, $7,600 in damaged parts, $3,357 m old parts 
6 superceded by a new part number, and $261.18 m discontinued 
7 parts. 
8 The sale of the dealership closed on November 14th, 2001. 
9 The parties met m Salt Lake City at a title company for the 
10 closing. As part of the closing both parties executed a closing 
11 statement. In the statement the parties agreed that used car 
12 inventory was valued at $290,275. No adjustments were made for 
13 parts, and no adjustments were made for oil, gas or grease. 
14 Labrum paid Coet $351,080 at the closing and commenced 
15 operations and management of the dealership on November 15th, 
16 2001. On or about December 12th, 2001 Coet issued a check for 
17 $2,300 to pay off a lien on some vehicle. It's disputed as to 
18 whether it was the Robinson's vehicle, tne 1991 Chevy that was 
19 traded m . It's disputed as to what vehicle that payoff was for, 
20 but Coet did issue a payoff check in the amount of $2300 on 
21 December 12th, 2001. 
22 In January 2002 Labrum sold the 1992 Ford pickup to Carl 
23 Givens for $5,000. The vehicle had remained on the lot until 
24 that time. Labrum had performed repair work, including the 
25 installation of a new windshield. From the time of closing on 
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1 the dealership to the date the vehicle was sold, Coet made no 
2 claim to the 1992 Ford pickup truck. 
3 Based on those findings of fact the Court reaches the 
4 following conclusions of law. Three issues are presented to the 
5 Court for decision. First, after the closing did Labrum or Coet 
6 own the 1992 Ford pickup. This issue turns on whether the truck 
7 was, quote, "in the seller's inventory at the time of closing and 
8 previously titled." 
9 Second, did Labrum pay Coet for oil, gas and grease 
10 purchased under the asset sale agreement, and third, did Coet 
11 make a fraudulent representation or negligent misrepresentation 
12 as to the issue of obsolete parts such that Labrum is entitled to 
13 damages. 
14 The Court concludes that the 1992 Ford pickup was in the 
15 seller's inventory at the time of closing. It was -- and that it 
16 was a previously titled vehicle. The parties agreed that the 
17 value of that inventory, including the 1992 Ford pickup, was 
18 $290,275. Labrum paid Coet that amount at closing and has no 
19 further obligation to him. 
20 To the extent that Coet's claims for breach of contract, 
21 breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unjust 
22 enrichment and conversion are based on that transaction, the 
23 Court concludes that those causes of action fail. 
24 At the time the parties closed on the transaction on the 
25 sale of the dealership, they intended final settlement of all 
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1 obligations to each other. Where adjustments needed to be made 
2 based on physical inventories the parties made those adjustments. 
3 No adjustment was made as to oil, gas and grease; therefore, the 
4 Court concludes that Coet's claims fail as to that issue. 
5 In the absence of any claim for fraud or negligent 
6 misrepresentation nhe same would be true as to adjustments for 
7 parts. On the face of the closing documents tne parties agreed 
8 that no adjustment was necessary relating to parts under the 
9 asset sale agreement. 
10 Turning to the issue of fraud,, the elements of fraud 
11 claim are that Coet made a representation concerning a presently 
12 existing material fact which was false, which he either knew to 
13 be false or made recklessly knowing that he had insufficient 
14 knowledge upon which to base the representation. Coet did this 
15 for the purpose of inducing Labrum to act upon it, and Labrum 
16 acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity did in fact 
17 rely, and was thereby induced to act to Labrum's injury and 
18 damage. 
19 In the case of Jardme vs. Brunswick, the Utah Supreme 
20 Court held that, "Where one having a pecuniary interest in a 
21 transaction is m a superior position to know material facts and 
22 carelessly or negligently makes a false representation concerning 
23 them, expecting the other party to rely and act thereon, and the 
24 other party reasonably does so and suffers loss in that 
25 transaction, the representor can be held responsible if the other 
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1 elements of fraud are also present." 
2 |n the instant case the Court concludes that Coet made a 
3 representation of presently existing material fact which was 
4 false. He told Labrum in the context of the parties -- parts 
5 inventory that Coet did not ha ve an obsolete parts problem. That 
6 statement was false. In fact, Coet had approximately $18,000 in 
7 obsolete parts representing between 22 to 25 percent of its total 
8 inventory. 
9 Tjie statement was made knowing that Coet had 
10 insufficient knowledge upon which to base that representation. 
11 The Court reaches that conclusion based on -- I believe it's 
12 Exhibit D-11 which shows that approximately $25,000 in parts had 
13 not been moved for approximately — or for more than 12 months. 
14 Tfie statement was made to induce Labrum to rely, and m 
15 fact Labrum did rely and was induced to act by signing a closing 
16 statement without an obsolete parts adjustment. This caused 
17 damage to Labrum in the amount of $18,862.50. However, as to 
18 some of tho.s amount Labrum's reliance was not reliable -- or was 
19 not reasonable. 
20 A2]so m the case of Jardme vs. Brunswick, the Court — 
21 the Utah Supreme Court has held, "The one who complains of 
22 being injured by a false representation cannot heedlessly accept 
23 as true whatever is told him, but has the duty of exercising 
2 4 such degree of care to protect his own interests as would be 
25 exercised by an ordinary, reasonable and prudent person under the 
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1 circumstances; and if he fails to do so is precluded from holding 
2 someone else to account for the consequences of his own neglect." 
3 The Court concludes that an ordinary reasonable person 
4 in Mr. Labrum's position would have identified by the current 
5 manufacturer's price list non-GM parts, discontinued parts, old 
6 part — and old parts. Labrum, on the other hand, was in the 
7 best position to ascertain whether the parts in his inventory 
8 were damaged or incomplete such that GM would not accept return. 
9 As to these parts amounting to -- or valued at $11,455.26 Labrum 
10 reasonably relied to its detriment on the misrepresentation of 
11 Coet and is therefore entitled to judgment in that amount. 
12 the Court reserves the issue of attorney's fees to allow 
13 the parties to brief the question of who is the prevailing party 
14 in light of prior settlements of some claims and the Court's 
15 judgment entered today, and also to allow the parties to file fee 
16 affidavits pursuant to Rule 73. 
17 Glounsel, how long would it take you to brief that 
18 question of prevailing party? 
19 Mjl. CALL: Your Honor, I'm currently in the throws of a 
20 motion for preliminary injunction scheduled to be heard in Ohio 
21 on August 28th, which has be deeply consumed between now and then. 
22 I would prefer, if it would please the Court, to have a couple of 
23 weeks past that date. 
24 THE COURT: Do you have any objection to that, Mr. Howe? 
25 MR. HOWE: No objection. 
ADDENDUM "K" 
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DANNY R. LABRUM, individually, and 
LABRUM CHEVROLET PONTIAC BUICK, 
INC., and RONALD L. COVEY, individually 
and as personal guarantor, 
Defendants. 
RULING 
Case No. 030500537 
Judge Derek P. Pullan 
This matter comes before the Court on cross-motions for attorney's fees and costs. 
Plaintiff Larry J. Coet Chevrolet, Pontiac, Buick, Inc. ("Coet") filed its motion for an award of 
attorney's fees and costs on August 29, 2006. Defendants Danny R. Labrum and Labrum Chevrolet 
Pontiac Buick, Inc. (collectively "Labrum") filed a memorandum in opposition to Coet's motion and in 
support of Labrum's request for attorney's fees on September 15, 2006. Coet filed a reply and 
opposition memorandum on October 2, 2006. Labrum filed a reply memorandum and request to submit 
for decision on October 10, 2006. The parties have not requested oral argument. 
Having considered the pleadings, the Court now enters the following: 
RULING 
In August 2001, the parties entered into an Asset Sale Agreement ('"the Agreement") whereby 
Coet sold the Chevrolet dealership in Heber City to Labrum. After the sale closed, a dispute arose as to 
who owed what to whom. Coet brought this action against Labrum who counterclaimed. 
In February 2006, the parties through their counsel entered into a Letter Agreement to resolve the 
bulk of their respective claims. Each party designated a certified public accountant to act as a member of 
an evaluation team. The team would conduct an independent examination, assessment, and application 
of the Agreement "for the purpose of resolving all of the respective claims between the parties, with the 
exception of whether either party is legally responsible to the other party for parts obsolescence," (Letter 
Agreement, 1f 3). 
Unanimous findings by the evaluation team were "binding on the parties," each of whom agreed 
to pay the other any sum the team determined was owed. Upon payment, each party "released and 
forever discharged [the other] from any and all claims, demands, suits, causes of action or obligations of 
whatever nature, known or unknown, contingent or non-contingent. . . including without limitation all 
claims that relate in any way to [this action], . . . and any claims asserted or that could have been asserted 
in [this action]." (Letter Agreement, f^ 9). Excepted from this release were issues upon which the team 
did not reach unanimous agreement and issues relating to liability for parts obsolescence. 
The evaluation team unanimously agreed that Labrum owed Coet $73,711.18 and Coet owed 
Labrum $14,326.39. The net result was that Labrum owed Coet $59,384.79. Labrum paid this amount 
to Coet on May 13, 2005. Coet accepted the payment but contended that it was entitled to be paid more 
money for interest and attorney's fees. The Court rejected Coet's contention, ruling on two separate 
occasions that Coet's claims for attorney's fees and interest were released and waived under the Letter 
Agreement. (Order Granting Labrum's Partial Motion for Summary Judgment, 9/2/05; Ruling, 8/3/06). 
After the evaluation team completed its work, three narrow issues were tried to the Court: (1) 
whether Labrum owed Coet for a 1992 Ford truck; (2) whether Labrum owed Coet for oil, gas, and 
grease; and (3) whether Coet made a fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation regarding obsolete parts 
entitling Labrum to damages. Neither party contends that the Letter Agreement constituted a release and 
waiver of attorney's fees incurred to prosecute these remaining claims in the district court. 
At trial, the Court ruled in favor of Labrum on all claims. Labrum was awarded $11,455.26 in 
damages. 
Each party contends that it is the "prevailing party" and is entitled to attorney's fees under the 
Agreement. The Agreement reads: 
In the event any action or proceeding is taken or brought by either party 
concerning this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover 
its costs and reasonable attorneys' fees, whether such sums are expended 
with or without suit, at trial, on appeal or in any bankruptcy or insolvency 
proceeding.1 
lThis provision is drafted broadly. It applies to "any action or proceeding . . . taken or 
brought by either Party concerning this Agreement." By using the verbs "taken" and "brought" 
in the alternative, the parties expanded the meaning of the term "action." Certainly civil actions 
"brought" by either party could give rise to an award of attorney's fees, but so could "any action 
taken . . . concerning this Agreement. . . whether [the fees] are expended with or without trial." 
Here, the parties resolved the bulk of their claims without trial by submitting them to the 
evaluation team. That method of settlement—during the course of which both parties incurred 
attorney's fees—constituted an action taken by the parties concerning the Agreement. Absent the 
release and waiver in the Letter Agreement, the prevailing party as determined by the evaluation 
team was entitled to recover its costs and attorney's fees. 
3 
Agreement, p. 18. 
A "prevailing party" includes one "in whose favor a judgment is rendered, regardless of the 
amount of damages awarded" and one who "successfully defends and avoids adverse judgment." 
A.K.&R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Guv, 47 P.3d 92, 95 (Utah Ct. App. 2002); R.T. Nielsen 
Company v. Cook. 40 P.3d 1119, 1126 (Utah 2002). 
Determining who is the prevailing party is more complicated "in cases involving multiple claims 
and parties . . . and where the ultimate award of money damages does not adequately represent the actual 
success of the parties under the peculiar posture of the case." A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating 
v. Guy, 2004 UT 427, f 10, 94 P.3d 270, quoting, Mountain States Broad Co. v. Neale, 776 P.2d 643, 
649, n. 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (Mountain States I). Such cases "demonstrate the need for a flexible and 
reasoned approach" based on common sense. Id.. 
The starting point for that approach is the net judgment rule. However, because the net judgment 
rule—when "mechanically applied in all cases"—can lead to absurd results, two "additional 
perspectives" may be considered—"comparative victory" and "who won a greater percentage of the 
amount it had claimed in damages or offsets." A.K. & R. Whipple, 2004 UT 427, ^f 12,13, quoting, 
Mountain States Broad Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (Mountain States ID. Thus, a 
party who obtains a judgment for a small fraction of what he sought may not necessarily be a "prevailing 
party" entitled to attorney's fees. Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Sav. Bank v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). 
4 rf& 
There is a dispute as to whether the Court should consider amounts awarded to the parties by the 
evaluation team. Coet argues that these amounts are relevant in determining who is the prevailing party. 
Labrum contends that a settlement of some issues in advance of trial is immaterial because any payments 
made do not constitute a judgment. In support of its position, Labrum also cites the Court to Cantrell v. 
International Broth. Of Electric Workers, 69 F.3d 456 (10th Cir. 1995). 
In Cantrell the Tenth Circuit Court overruled Mobile Power Enterprises, Inc. v. Power Vac, Inc., 
496 F.2d 1311, 1312 (10th Cir. 1974) which held a defendant was not a prevailing party under Rule 
54(d) if the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The Court held that "in cases 
not involving a settlement, when a party dismisses an action with or without prejudice, the district court 
has discretion to award costs to the prevailing party under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)." From this statement, 
Labrum infers that where settlement has occurred, the district court has no discretion to award costs to 
the prevailing party. This inference is tenuous. The Cantrell court did not decide whether a partial 
settlement of claims in advance of trial should be considered in determining which party prevailed after 
trial. 
At the time a complaint or counterclaim is filed, a party knows something of the facts supporting 
his own claims, and usually less about the facts supporting his opponent's. As the case proceeds, this 
limited understanding grows. It is not uncommon for parties—whose views have been illuminated by 
discovery—to resolve claims in advance of trial. Parties may do so for a variety of reasons—personal, 
economic, legal, or strategic. In some instances, the reason may be wholly unrelated to the merits of the 
settled claim. Likewise, pre-trial settlements are accomplished by a variety of means—unilateral 
concession, negotiation, stipulation, mediation, arbitration. These methods in turn vary in the degree to 
they are grounded in an evaluation of the underlying facts and law. 
Thus, a partial settlement in advance of trial may say nothing about the factual or legal merit of 
the settled claim. Admittedly, in this case the method resolution required an assessment of the facts. 
Nevertheless, this is not always the case. The motives for and methods of pre-trial settlement are simply 
too diverse. For that reason, a rule requiring the Court to consider pre-trial settlements in determining 
who is the prevailing party is unworkable. Prevailing party analysis must be grounded only in claims 
litigated through trial and resulting in a judgment.2 
In this action, Labrum prevailed on all litigated claims. The Court concludes that he is the 
prevailing party. Labrum seeks attorney's fees incurred as to these litigated claims after May 13, 2005, 
(the date he paid Coet the amount determined by the evaluation team). After that date, Labrum5s 
attorney's fees related to the prosecution of litigated claims only. 
For the reasons stated in Labrum's memoranda and fees affidavit, the Court finds that Labrum's 
fees meet the requirements of state law. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988). Coet 
does not challenge Labrum's attorney's fees on these grounds. 
2One exception to this rule would be cases in which a partial pre-trial settlement was 
reduced to judgment. This could occur in many ways, including a confession of judgment or 
judgment after confirmation of an arbitration award. Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(f); Utah Code Ann. 
78-3 la-126 (after confirmation of arbitration award, court shall enter a judgment conforming to 
the award). 
6 r Y ' ^ 
The Court requests that counsel for Labrum prepare an order and judgment consistent with this 
decision. 
DATED this _ / _ day of November, 2006. 
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DANNY R. LABRUM, individually, and 
LABRUM CHEVROLET PONTIAC 
BUICK, INC. and RONALD L. COVEY, 
individually and as Personal Guarantor 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
Civil No.: 030500537 
Judge: Derek P. Pullan 
This matter was tried to the Court on August 8, 2006 before the Honorable Judge Derek P. 
Pullan. Danny R. Labrum, individually, and Labrum Chevrolet Pontiac Buick, Inc. (collectively 
"Labrum) were represented by Keith A. Call and Larry J. Coet Chevrolet, Pontiac, Buick, Inc. 
W i S . 
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» 
("Coet") was represented by Gary R. Howe. Coet presented evidence on two claims against Labrum, 
and Labrum presented evidence on a counterclaim against Coet. 
At the close of Coet's case-in-chief, Danny R. Labrum (individually) moved for a directed 
verdict. Coet did not object to the motion. Accordingly, the Danny R. Labrum's motion was 
GRANTED, and all claims against Danny R. Labrum individually are dismissed with prejudice. 
At the conclusion of the trial, the Court announced from the bench its findings and 
conclusions, concluding that all of Coet's claims should be dismissed with prejudice and that 
Labrum was entitled to judgment against Coet in the amount of $11,455.26. 
After the trial, the parties briefed the issue of entitlement to attorneys fees and costs. Coet 
sought recovery of costs and fees in the amount of $44,958.29. Labrum sought recovery of fees in 
the amount of $29,715. On November 1, 2006, the Court entered its written Ruling, by which the 
Court determined that Coet is not entitled to recover its attorneys fees or costs and Labrum is entitled 
to recover its attorneys fees in the amount requested. By stipulation after November 1,2006, Labrum 
has agreed to reduce the amount of attorneys fees it seeks to $28,550. 
Based on the foregoing, and for the reasons stated by the Court at the trial and in the 
November 1,2006 Ruling, it is HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. All of Plaintiffs' claims are hereby dismissed in their entirety, with prejudice. 
2. Labrum Chevrolet Pontiac Buick, Inc. is hereby awarded JUDGMENT against Larry 
J. Coet Chevrolet, Pontiac, Buick, Inc. in the amount of $40,005.26, together with interest thereon 
from the date of this Judgment and Order at the rate of 6.36 percent per annum. 
3. Labrum is entitled to recover its additional reasonable attorneys' fees and costs 
incurred in connection with this matter and may submit supplemental affidavits of such fees and 
costs as appropriate. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Larry J. Coet, etal, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Danny R. Labrum, etal 
Defendant 
RULING 
Case No. 030500537 
This matter came before the Court for telephone conference on August 3, 2006. Plaintiff 
Larry J. Coet Chevrolet, Pontiac, Buick, Inc. ("Coet") was represented by Mr. Gary R. Howe. 
Defendants Danny R. Labrum, Labrum Chevrolet Pontiac Buick, Inc., and Ronald L. Covey 
(collectively "the Labrum Defendants") were represented by Mr. Keith A. Call. 
The telephone conference was conducted in chambers. Counsel for the parties waived the 
right to have the conference placed on the record. 
On July 20, 2006, the Labrum Defendants filed a Motion in Limine Re: Interest and 
Attorneys' Fees. Counsel for Coet indicated that Coet did not intend to file a written response but 
was prepared to argue the motion. 
The Labrum Defendants seek an order precluding Coet from presenting evidence or 
argument relating to interest or attorneys' fees. They argue that in its order granting the Labrum 
Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, the Court dismissed with prejudice Coet's 
claims for attorneys' fees and interest. (See, Order dated September 2, 2005). 
Coet does not disagree with this reading of the Court's prior order. However, Coet argues 
that in issuing that order, the Court was not aware of an important fact. Specifically, immediately 
after the sale of the dealership to Labrum, Coet refunded to Labrum $63,000.00 which was not in 
fact owing. Coet argues that for the next several years it was denied use of these funds and 
Labrum is obligated to pay interest on them. 
In its order granting partial summary judgment to the Labrum Defendants, the Court ruled 
that "[Coet's] claims for attorneys' fees and interest were released and waived under Section 9 of 
the Letter Agreement upon payment by Labrum Chevrolet of the sums determined by the 
accountants to be owed to [Coet]." Therefore, the Court dismissed with prejudice Coet's claims 
for attorneys' fees and prejudgment interest. Coet has never moved to reconsider this ruling. 
Therefore, it remains the law of the case. 
The Court grants the Labrum Defendants' motion in limine. At trial Coet shall be 
precluded from presenting any evidence or argument relating t^ig^Fest (Attorneys' fees. 
Dated this 3 rd day of August-
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ADDENDUM "N" 
(R-131-133) 
Ruling, June 21, 2005 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT -
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
'<' -;6 
Larry J Coet Chevrolet, 
Pontiac, Buick, Inc. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Danny R. Labrum, et al, 
Defendant. 
RULING 
Case No. 030500537 
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Larry J. Coet Chevrolet, Pontiac, Buick, 
Inc.'s Motion for Rule 16 (b) Management Conference. 
It appears that the Accounting Team was unable to resolve all accounting issues. 
Paragraph 3 of the Stipulated Case Management Order now in effect contemplated these 
circumstances and imposed a longer period of fact discovery in the event of continuing accounting 
disputes. At this juncture, the Court does not perceive any reason why this extended schedule has 
been rendered unworkable. Still, other issues appear to be in dispute, and the parties believe that 
a scheduling conference will be helpful. Therefore, Plaintiff Coet's motion for scheduling 
conference is granted. 
Dated this ^jf^VJ^Iff^ 2005. 
14-Cl 
4TH DISTRICT COURT - HEBER COURT 
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
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CONFERENCE is sch-iu1-i 
07/21/2005 
09 :00 a.m. 
COURTROOM 1 
WASATCH COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
13 61 SOUTH HIGHWAY 4 0 
HEBER, UT 84032 
DEREK P PULLAN 
Dated t h i s 
*>/Lx 
Iday of Oune •To o 
y 
District Court eput Clerk 
ai_ 
ir viOU NEED AN INTERPRETER, PLEASE NOTIFY THE COURT at 
(435)654-4676(five days before your hearing, if possible). In 
criminal cases and in some other proceedings, the court will 
arrange for the interpreter and will pay the interpreter's fees. 
You muse use an Interpreter from the list provided by the court. 
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individual 
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative 
aids and services) during this proceeding should call WASATCH 
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ADDENDUM "O" 
Utah Code Ann. §15-1-1 
Page 
UT ST § 15-1-1 Page 
U.C.A. 1953 § 15-1 1 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 15. Contracts and Obligations in General 
*ii Chapter 1. Interest 
-• § 15-1.-1. Interest rates--Contracted rate--Legal rate 
(1) The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any rate of interest for the 
loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action that is the subject of 
their contract. 
(2) Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest, the 
legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose 
in action shall be 10% per annum. 
(3) Nothing in this section may be construed in any way to affect any penalty or 
interest charge that by law applies to delinquent or other taxes or to any 
contract or obligations made before May 14, 1981. 
Laws 1907, c. 46, § 1/ Laws 1935, c. 42, § 1; Laws 1981, c. 73, § 1; Laws .1985, 
c. 159, § 6; Laws 1989, c. 79, § 1. 
Codifications C.L. 190 1 , § : 24.1; C.L. 1917, § 3320; R.S. 1933, § 44-0-1; C. 
1943, § 44-0-1. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Consumer Credit Code, see § 70C-1-101 et seq. 
Negotiable instruments, interest, see § 70A-3-112. 
Statutes of limitation, effect of interest payment, see % 73-] 2-44. 
LAW REVIEW AMD JOURNAL COMMENTARIES 
Lee, Trail Mountain Coal Co. v. Utah Division of State Lands & Forestry. Can 
States Retroactively Alter Their Own Contractual Obligations?, 1997 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 
943 (1997). 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Interest €=^31, 32. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 219k31; 219k32. 
C.J.S. Interest and Usury; Consumer Credit §§ 37, 38. 
NOTES OF DECISIONS 
® 2 007 Thornson/West. No Claim to Oria. U.S. Govt. Works. 
ADDENDUM "P" 
Utah Code Ann. §15-1-4 
Paje " »l 11 
Westlaw 
UT ST 3 15-1-4 Page 1 
U.C.A. 1953 § 15-1-4 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Carrentness 
Title 15. Contracts and Obligations in General 
*li Chapter 1. Interest 
- + t i "> I i ^.ijt n udgments 
(1) As used in this section, "federal postjudgment interest rate" means the 
interest rate estaol-shed for the federal court system under 28 U.S.C. Sec 1961, 
as amended 
(2)(a) Except as provided m Sucseccion (2)(b), a judgment rendered on a lawful 
contract shall conform to the contract and snail bear the interest agreed upor bv 
the parties, whicn snail ce specified m the judgment. 
(b) A judgment rendered on a deferred deposit loan suoject to Title 7, Chapter 
23, Check Cashing Registration Act, shall bear interest at the rate imposed under 
Subsection (3) on an amount not exceeding the sum of: 
(I) the tota1 ^r " h 3 „_ r _ c a . La^^nce of tne deferred deposit loan; 
(ii) interest at the rate imposed by the deferred deposit loan agreement for a 
period not exceeding 12 ^/PPKS PS provided m Suosection 7-23-105(4); 
(1*1 c -/ s 13 
(iv) attorney fees, and 
(v) other amounts allowed by law and ordered by the court. 
(3)(a) Except as otherwise provided cy law, otner civil and criminal judgments of 
the district court and justice court shall bear interest at tne federal 
postjudgment interest: rate as of January 1 of eacn year, plus 2% 
(b) The postjudgment interest rate m effect at the time of tne judgment shall 
remain t^e uterest rate for tne duration of the judgment 
(c) The interest on criminal judgments snail be calculated on the total amount of 
tne judgment. 
id) Interest paid on state revenue shall be deposited m accordance witn Section 
63A-8-301 
(e) Interest paid on revenue to a county or municipality shall be paid to the 
general fund of tne county or municipality. 
^ 2007 Thomson/West. Mo Claim to Grig Get Works. 
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